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Abstract
The Incident Command System (ICS) is entirely a management tool which creates a scope 
for the civil organization to establish a temporary organization which will help them to carry 
out the emergency response operation smoothly. The ICS was incorporated from military 
structure. The well defined and command structure inspires the civil organization to adopt 
ICS. In the world most developed countries are now following the ICS in their emergency 
response system. Recently India has also formulated the guideline for ICS in their country. 
This study focuses the action frame work of the Armed Forces at District level basing on the 
context of ICS. The action framework of Armed Forces is proposed through various models 
with their advantages and disadvantages. This dissertation also tries to focus on the proposed 
communication system for the ICS. At the end this dissertation recommends guidelines for 
the successful implementation of ICS in Bangladesh.
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C H A PTER  1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background o f the study
The revaluation of industrialization turned the humankind more ahead and closer to his 
dream. Rapid change of technology and innovation of various equipments increased the 
demand of setting up new industry. Besides developed countries, the developing countries 
are also changing their views from agricultural to industrialization based development. 
The industrialization process gives rapid progress but it has got negative impact on 
environment. In the present world it has been observed that the developed countries emit 
maximum CFC gas which is the cause of global warming and due to global warming, 
country like Bangladesh is facing a number of disasters within a short notice than in the 
past. After independence the Government of Bangladesh tried to manage the natural 
disaster with its own efforts and the support from foreign aids as well. The disaster 
management system in Bangladesh never gave any scope for the government ministries or 
Armed Forces to work with the NGOs or any other organization other than government 
one. But now a day due to rapid climate change the intensity o f natural disaster has 
increased extensively with its shape and size. As a result the government needs to involve 
all the agencies including the GO, NGO’s and its defense force to mitigate the disaster in 
a same chain. But these various agencies have got their own jurisdiction, legal framework 
and way o f dealings. So they need a common organizational structure, communication 
system and well coordinated approach to mitigate the disaster. To overcome this issue, 
the recently revised SOD has incorporated the incident management system. The incident 
management system was first introduced by the fire department of California in 1970 to 
solve the wildfire problem as it needs to involve a number of agencies there. Later on this 
incident management system (ICS) proved workable in various situations like natural 
disaster, wildfire, oil spills and even against terrorism. The USA and many other 
countries also included this ICS in their disaster management mechanism to provide a 
well defined action framework for all the agencies including GO and NGO.
The ICS provide a common and defined structure where the duties and responsibilities of 
all individuals are well described according to their respective appointments. Actually the 
ICS is a system where it creates a scope to work together for various agencies having 
different organizational structures or jurisdictions. In case of ICS when any natural or 
man made disaster needs to involve a number of responders to mitigate the disaster the
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ICS nominates the incident commander from the leading responder. The incident 
commander will act as a chief coordinator. He/She will organize the rest of the 
responder’s agencies according to ICS’s prescribed structures basing on their roles. The 
incident commander shall have three command staffs like the Liaison officer, the Safety 
officer and the information officer who will assist him/her to coordinate all the agencies. 
The responder agencies will be divided into 4 sections such as operation, planning, 
logistics, finance and administration. All these sections are further divided into various 
sub sections or branches. The ICS will be further explained in the following chapters.
1.2 Disaster Management: A combined approach
Disaster management is now become a vital factor for the governments in developed and 
developing countries. Now the development and progress of a country are not only 
dependent on its foreign and trade policy rather it may also be affected by its disaster 
management plan and policies. The sound management of the disaster can ensure the 
smooth prosperity and development of a country. And this can only be achieved by 
participation of all government ministries including defense force, non governmental 
organizations and collective approach from all levels from a community. To accumulate 
all these different organizations in a single management system need a well defined 
action framework this will guide the respective organizations to achieve their goals. 
These organizations also need well understanding and better relation among them for 
sound responding during disaster. In most countries of the world, the role of Armed 
forces or the military administration during disaster has got the trend to play an active and 
leading role (mainly in 3rd world countries) in disaster management because of its well 
trained manpower, own supply system, self sustainability, heretical chain of command 
and vast mobilization power. In modern world with democratic governmental 
environment the Armed forces though they still play the pivotal role but they have to 
abide by the directives and are led and control by the democratic government. Particularly 
in 3rd world countries, the Armed forces in spite of their leading role during disaster 
management have to be remaining in supportive role to the democratic government at all 
levels. In such circumstances the Armed forces needs a clear and well defined action 
framework under which they can contribute maximum. In Bangladesh perspective we 
have to adopt an action framework for Armed forces basing on the historical background 
and relation between military administration with political environment, civil 
administration and NGO’s. The action framework should be adopted with the guide line
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of revised Standing Orders on Disaster 2010 and without hampering of government’s own 
structure and in conjunction with political and social condition of the country.
1.3 W orld-wide role of armed forces in disaster management
In Mexico City earthquake o f year 1985, the government was severely criticized by the 
public for not bringing in the army for more than routine security, despite President de la 
Madrid's stated reason that he wanted to employ large numbers of the victims in civil 
work projects rather than use the army to restore services and clear the rubbles. The 
second incident is the 9/21 or Chi Chi earthquake which struck the center o f Taiwan, on 
September 21, 1999 killing almost 2,500 and injuring thousands more. Over 10,000 
buildings collapsed and direct losses were estimated at US$ 14 billion. After this 
devastating earthquake, the central government gave official standing to military 
activities in its Emergency Decree o f September 25 .And that took 4 days after the 
earthquake though the Armed forces were represented in the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) by the Minister of Defense, but no specific duties had been spelled out for 
the military for responding disaster, even though they quickly mobilized and effectively 
responded to the earthquake victims.
It has been proved from the history of disaster that Armed forces played an outstanding 
role in spite of own institutional limitations. The military resources o f any country are the 
most disciplined and trained organization which can provide support to a full range of 
public services such as public works, communications, transport, health and emergency 
medical services, rescue and support activities. They can react quickly and respond 
rapidly in a fully self contained, self sufficient and highly mobile fashion. Defense 
personnel are well trained in the individual skills necessary to perform their professional 
and functional activities and are practical in collaboration and coordinated action under an 
integrated/flexible management system. Thus there is enormous potential inherent in 
defense organizations to serve as an additional instrument for effective delivery of 
emergency assistance. These all qualities facilitate the Armed forces to contribute in 
disaster management. But in the cases like Mexico City earthquake or the Taiwan’s Chi 
Chi earthquake, the government could not judiciously utilize their Armed forces to 
response to the disaster. And thereby these governments were highly criticized by their 
people. In the year 2005 in Pakistan there was an earthquake in Azad Kasmir which 
caused deaths of about 18,000 and injuries 40,000 people. The civil administrations 
totally collapsed and the affected people were truly dependent on military administration 
for the relief and response. Later on the Armed forces or the military administration
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helped the civil administration to regain the control of that affected region. So in the 
cases of disaster Management the participation of Armed forces is undeniable.
Like in many other countries Government of Bangladesh (GOB) also feels the urgency of 
the Armed forces in responding natural disaster. Thereby the Armed forces also become 
an important part of the National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) under the direct 
supervision o f Prime Minister. Bangladesh government could successfully introduce the 
disaster management committee from national level to union level involving Prime 
Minister to union Chairman. Recently Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD) 2010 were 
revised by Ministry o f Food and Disaster Management and Disaster Management Bureau 
and a draft disaster management Act 2008 was also prepared. As a part of the 
development in the field of disaster management, GOB has also introduced the National 
Plan for Disaster Management and a National Disaster Management Policy is to be 
formulated and adopted very soon.
1.4 Bangladesh Armed Forces in Disaster M anagement
In Taiwan’s Chi Chi earthquake, some of the case studies revealed that being a member 
o f the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) the Armed forces of Taiwan was not given 
any specific duties for responding to the disaster. But in case of Bangladesh the picture is 
totally different. The Armed forces of Bangladesh has achieved the confidence of the 
general mass by participating as an active member in disaster from its independence till 
present, and it could be ensured due to proper utilization o f Armed forces by the GOB 
through its policies and plan. In latest revised SOD of year 2010 a new revaluation took 
place by incorporating Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA 2005-2015) and SAARC 
Framework for Action (SFA) and basing on that the SOD 2010 introduced some new 
features like an outline of disaster management regulative framework, introduction of 
core groups for emergency response at various levels, a new section on multi-agency 
disaster incident management system, introduction of risk reduction roles and 
responsibilities for all committees and agencies and a new outline for local level Plans. In 
SOD all the government ministries and Non-Government Organizations (NGO) charter of 
roles and responsibilities are described; besides that action o f Armed forces is also 
mentioned in SOD. It also includes coordination at various levels, inter-ministerial as well 
as between civil and military administrations. The recent SOD also gave emphasis on 
coordination between government ministries and NGO’s. At present disaster scenario, a 
sound plan for disaster management needs a comprehensive and integrated participation 
of all GO and NGOs as well as a well coordination among these groups. The participation
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of all the agencies needs a comprehensible action framework which will clearly define the 
role and responsibilities of all the participators in the disaster management activities.
1.5 Present Context o f ICS in Bangladesh
Since the Government of Bangladesh has decided to implement the Incident Command 
System (ICS) in the national disaster management plan, there is a greater need for 
institutionalizing the Incident Command Systems and strengthening professional 
approach towards disaster response activities in the country in addition to promoting 
coordination and cooperation among various agencies and organizations. The incident 
management system or ICS is very new and challenging concept for our country. It 
involves a good number of different agencies in the same chain or system. So in this 
system all the participated agencies need a strong understanding and well coordination 
among them. The developed countries like USA and Europe have a different culture, 
relation and understanding which are totally different from the countries like Bangladesh, 
India or Pakistan. Again in regional level still we have some differences like the relation 
of Civil-Military administration in India and Bangladesh. The political condition of this 
region was not the same. In case of Pakistan and Bangladesh the most conspicuous model 
of civil-military relations in weak regimes or unstable states is the praetorian model. In 
this model the intervention of military administration takes place a number of times. 
Thereby military bureaucracy is strong and playing a vital role over politics. But in case 
of India and Sri Lanka, the pictures are different; their armies are controlled by the 
civilian authority. So the implementation of the incident command system may vary 
basing on these issues.
During disaster the deployment of armed forces are varied basing on the intensity of the 
disaster and resilience of civil administration on that particular disaster. In Bangladesh the 
armed forces are deployed under the act of In Aid of Civil Power. The scale or the mode 
of deployment of armed forces varied in terms of strengths and activities basing on the 
following different scenarios of natural disaster.
• When the intensity of a disaster is very high and the affected area is vast and 
the civil administration is totally collapsed (Pakistan Earthquake in 08 
October 2005).
• When the intensity of a disaster is high and the entire disaster affected area 
can’t be managed by the civil administration (Flood 1988 in Bangladesh).
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• When the intensity o f a disaster is normal and the disaster prone area can be 
manageable by the civil administration (Fire break out, water crisis in the city 
area).
Basing on the above mentioned scenario Armed forces determined their composition, 
strength of the force and command and control (C2). The action frame work of the Armed 
forces may not be the same in all situations. So the different natural disaster scenarios will 
represent different types of action framework and C2 will also change basing on that 
framework. In incident management system these consideration has to be incorporated 
and we have to adopt the ICS in the government structure without disturbing the existing 
system and considering the context of culture and language of our courtiers. This paper 
briefly discusses about the greater role that can be played by the Armed Forces in the 
context of ICS in different disaster response operations at district level in which their 
services can be better utilized. It also indicates the necessary guidelines to the civil 
authorities while utilizing the services of the Armed Forces personal to ensure greater co­
ordination and enhance efficiency during disaster response operations.
1.6 Objective o f the Study
The main objective of this research is to assess the feasibility and formulate an action 
framework for Bangladesh Armed Forces at district level depending on Incident 
Command/Unified Command System context without disturbing the present government 
structure, and provide a guide line for the civil administration to obtain maximum service 
from Armed forces. The research paper has the following objectives;
• Formulate a well defined action framework for armed forces basing 
on the different disaster response operations;
• Propose a plan to incorporate the ICS in present government structure 
without disturbing the existing system;
• Define the command and control of armed forces in ICS basing on 
different scenarios and civil military relation (CMR) in present 
context;
• Define the role and relation of NGO’s with armed forces in ICS;
1.6.1 Limitations
The incident command System is very new concept in our disaster management plan. Still 
the governmental agencies including Armed forces didn’t incorporate this system in their
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disaster management plan. For this reason this research paper has been prepared based on 
primary data which were collected from interviews from different personal including high 
officials in civil, military administration, NGOs and different professionals basing on 
present system and relation between the organizations which are very important factors 
for the new concept of Incident Command System (ICS). During interview some of the 
sensitive questions might be avoided by the high officials intentionally or unintentionally 
or that they might not be able to describe the full situation. In that case the second-hand 
data, such as information on websites, in newspapers, and in government reports, were 
utilized.
1.7 Methodology
1.7.1 Primary data
The Incident Command System (ICS) is yet to introduce by governmental agencies 
including Armed Forces. The ICS is a very new concept in our revised Standing Order on 
Disaster Management 2010. At present we don’t have any study or research in our 
country basing on this system. The Armed Forces still not prepared or formulated any 
draft action framework in ICS context. For this reason this research paper has been 
prepared based on primary data which were collected from interviews from different 
personal including high official in civil-military administration, NGOs and different 
professionals. Because these personal from different organizations has to work under ICS 
jointly, so from their views I tried to find out the advantages and disadvantages while 
working together at present system. To carry out this research I need to interview of civil 
and military bureaucrats who have the experience on emergency response operation (like 
DG, Disaster Management Bureau, DG, Red Crescent Society or Operational Officer at 
G1 grade or Director, Joint operation from Armed Forces Division). This research also 
includes the interview from different classes of people especially from the various groups 
as mentioned bellow:
Table 1.1: The Background of the Interviewees
Serial Group Number of person Age limit
1 Civil bureaucrats 03 45 to 60
2 Military bureaucrats 03 40 to 55
3 Researcher 02 50 to 70
4 NGOs (High officials) 03 45 to 60
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The interviews required 03 months because it was difficult to arrange them for various 
reasons, such as willingness to participate and tight schedules. The questions were simple: 
the interviewees were asked to describe what they and their organizations do in the 
emergency response operation in earlier system and how they will work in present new 
Incident command system. Common Questions were asked on command, control and 
authority. And some of the questions were on civil-military relation and cooperation, 
NGOs role during disaster and knowledge on ICS. In addition, they were asked to put 
their suggestions on the new concept of ICS and its better utilization without hampering 
the present governmental context.
1.7.2 Secondary data
Secondary data, such as information on websites, in newspapers, and in government 
reports, were utilized because it was thought that interviewees might avoid some sensitive 
questions, intentionally or unintentionally, or that they might not have be able to describe 
the full situation as the ICS itself is a new concept in Bangladesh. So the information 
from the secondary data fulfilled that requirement.
CHAPTER 2 
EVOLUTION OF INCIDENT 
COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS)
2.1 Incident Command System (ICS)
ICS is a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to 
allow responders to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity 
and demands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by 
jurisdictional boundaries. In the early 1970s, ICS was developed to manage rapidly 
moving wildfires and to address the following problems:
Too many people reporting to one supervisor;
Different emergency response organizational structures;
Lack of reliable incident information;
Inadequate and incompatible communications;
Lack of structure for coordinated planning among agencies; 
unclear lines of authority;
• Terminology differences among agencies; and
• Unclear or unspecified incident objectives.
An ICS enables integrated communication and planning by establishing a manageable 
span of control. An ICS divides an emergency response into five manageable functions 
essential for emergency response operations: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, 
and Finance and Administration. Figure 1 below shows a typical ICS structure.
General Staff
Figure 2.1: Incident Command System Structure (Source: National Incident Management
System of USA, December 2008)
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2.2 History o f the Incident Command System (ICS)
Historically the origins of the Incident Command System are from the Military 
Reorganization Act of 1920. After returning from World War I, General’s Pershing and 
March completely revamped how the entire United States military effort was organized. 
During World War I there were approximately 20 separate bureaucracies that had to be 
dealt with during any part of the conflict. This cumbersome organizational structure was a 
severe impediment for the conduct of the war and they sought an organizational structure 
to streamline the process of military management. This extensive reorganization and 
streamlining led to the creation of the military G -l, G-2, G-3 and G-4 system that went 
into effect in all branches of the military service.
It was used to organize and march armies across Europe and the Pacific Ocean during 
World War II and it is still in use today. In the early 1970’s, a national project known as 
FIRESCOPE was convened to try and come up with an organizational system for fighting 
multi-state forest fires. When this group began to look around for a system that would 
manage large-scale critical incidents they began to examine the United States military. 
The military, by its very definition, is always in the emergency management business. So 
where better to look then at a system that was very effective in crisis management for 
well over 50 years? The FIRESCOPE group realized that the G 1-4 organizational 
structure was a proven tool with a solid track record in the management of the large, 
quick moving and sometime chaotic events of warfare; and it was adopted by the 
FIRESCOPE project and named the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS then quickly 
became the nationally recommended standard for all fire departments as an organizational 
system to use for management of large-scale critical incident events. Now many countries 
in the world they adopted this system in their disaster management plan. The Government 
of Bangladesh has recently incorporated the Incident Command System in the revised 
“Standing Order on Disaster (SOD) 2010”. Therefore this system now become 
mandatory for all governmental organizations including military administration for 
formulating respective action framework basing on the ICS context.
2.3 Some key points on ICS
The ICS has contained many key personal and they have their own role and 
responsibilities which are mentioned below:
• The Incident Commander is faced with many responsibilities when 
he/she arrives on scene. Unless specifically assigned to another member of the
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Command or General Staffs, these responsibilities remain with the IC. Some of 
the more complex responsibilities include:
■ Establish immediate priorities especially the safety of responders, 
other emergency workers, bystanders, and people involved in the 
incident
■ Stabilize the incident by ensuring life safety and managing 
resources efficiently and cost effectively.
■ Determine incident objectives and strategy to achieve the 
objectives.
■ Establish and monitor incident organization.
■ Approve the implementation of the written or oral Incident Action 
Plan.
■ Ensure adequate health and safety measures are in place.
• The Command S taff is responsible for public affairs, health and safety, 
and liaison activities within the incident command structure. The IC/UC remains 
responsible for these activities or may assign individuals to carry out these 
responsibilities and report directly to the IC/UC.
• The Information Officer's role is to develop and release information 
about the incident to the news media, to incident personnel, and to other 
appropriate agencies and organizations.
• The Liaison Officer’s role is to serve as the point of contact for assisting 
and coordinating activities between the IC/UC and various agencies and groups. 
This may include Congressional personnel, local government officials, and 
criminal investigating organizations and investigators arriving on the scene.
• The Safety Officer's role is to develop and recommend measures to the 
IC/UC for assuring personnel health and safety and to assess and/or anticipate 
hazardous and unsafe situations. The Safety Officer also develops the Site Safety 
Plan, reviews the Incident Action Plan for safety implications, and provides 
timely, complete, specific, and accurate assessment of hazards and required 
controls.
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• The General S taff includes Operations, Planning, Logistics, and 
Finance/Administrative responsibilities. These responsibilities remain with the 
IC until they are assigned to another individual. When the Operations, Planning, 
Logistics or Finance/Administrative responsibilities are established as separate 
functions under the IC, they are managed by a section chief and can be supported 
by other functional units.
• The Operations S taff is responsible for all operations directly applicable 
to the primary mission of the response.
• The Planning Staff is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and 
disseminating the tactical information related to the incident, and for preparing 
and documenting Incident Action Plans (IAPs).
• The Logistics S taff is responsible for providing facilities, services, and 
materials for the incident response.
• The Finance and Administrative S taff is responsible for all financial, 
administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the incident.
The modular organization of the ICS allows responders to scale their efforts and apply the 
parts of the ICS structure that best meet the demands of the incident. In other words, there 
are no hard and fast rules for when or how to expand the ICS organization. Many 
incidents will never require the activation of Planning, Logistics, or 
Finance/Administration Sections, while others will require some or all o f them to be 
established. A major advantage of the ICS organization is the ability to fill only those 
parts of the organization those are required. For some incidents, and in some applications, 
only a few o f the organization’s functional elements may be required. However, if there is 
a need to expand the organization, additional positions exist within the ICS framework to 
meet virtually any need. For example, in responses involving responders from a single 
jurisdiction, the ICS establishes an organization for comprehensive response 
management. However, when an incident involves more than one agency or jurisdiction, 
responders can expand the ICS framework to address a multi-jurisdictional incident.
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2.4 Unified Command (UC)
Although a single Incident Commander normally handles the command function, an ICS 
organization may be expanded into a Unified Command (UC). The UC is a structure that 
brings together the "Incident Commanders" of all major organizations involved in the 
incident in order to coordinate an effective response while at the same time carrying out 
their own jurisdictional responsibilities. The UC links the organizations responding to the 
incident and provides a forum for these entities to make consensus decisions. Under the 
UC, the various jurisdictions and/or agencies and non-government responders may blend 
together throughout the operation to create an integrated response team. The UC is 
responsible for overall management of the incident. The UC directs incident activities, 
including development and implementation of overall objectives and strategies, and 
approves ordering and releasing of resources. Members of the UC work together to 
develop a common set of incident objectives and strategies, share information, maximize 
the use of available resources, and enhance the efficiency o f the individual response 
organizations.
2.5 Utilization of Unified Command
The UC may be used whenever multiple jurisdictions are involved in a response effort. 
These Jurisdictions could be represented by:
• Geographic boundaries (e.g., two districts or Divisions in case of 
Bangladesh perspective);
• Governmental levels (e.g., local, district, state in case of Bangladesh 
perspective);
• Functional responsibilities (e.g., fire fighting, oil spill, Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS));
• Statutory responsibilities (e.g., federal land or resource managers, 
responsible party under OPA or CERCLA); or
• Some combination of the above.
2.6 Relationship between ICS and UC
An ICS may be expanded to include a UC for complex responses, which often require 
multi-agency resources from the local, state, and federal levels. When it becomes 
necessary to establish a UC, the UC replaces the Incident Commander function and 
becomes an essential component of an ICS. In this way, the UC provides the
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organizational management tool to facilitate and coordinate the effective involvement of 
the various agencies; it creates the link between the organizations responding to the 
incident and provides a forum for these agencies to make decisions with which all 
responders can agree.
2.7 Advantages of an ICS/UC
An ICS led by a UC has been used to manage local, district and state responses to 
complex multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional incidents. The following is a list of the 
advantages of an ICS/UC:
• Uses a common language and response culture;
• Optimizes combined efforts;
• Eliminates duplicative efforts;
• Establishes a single command post;
• Allows for collective approval of operations, logistics, planning, and finance 
Activities;
• Encourages a cooperative response environment;
• Allows for shared facilities, reducing response costs, maximizing efficiency, and 
minimizing communication breakdowns; and
• Permits responders to develop and implement one consolidated IAP.
The ICS/UC structure outlines responsibilities and functions, thereby reducing potential 
conflicts, and improving information flow among all participating organizations. The ICS 
maintains its modular organizational structure, so that none of the advantages of the ICS 
are lost by the introduction of a UC.
2.8 Important key to successful implementation of an ICS/UC
The key to successful implementation of an ICS/UC is planning and exercising at the 
regional and area levels. Practice using an ICS/UC prior to an incident will help 
responders understand their roles and responsibilities and prepare them to work together 
in the ICS. When responders understand each other’s roles and responsibilities and have a 
plan for working together, they are more likely to be able to reach consensus on response 
strategies and tactics. To be most effective, there are four keys to implementing an ICS 
with a UC.
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Plan How the ICS/UC will be implemented in varying situations should be 
decided well in advance of an incident. The ACP process should be used to 
identify roles and responsibilities of the various participants during different 
response scenarios.
• Start early As soon as two organizations are determined to have responsibility 
for, or in, a response, an ICS/UC should be implemented.
• Practice Periodic training and drills are crucial to providing training and role- 
playing opportunities. To maintain proficiency, using ICS on smaller spills and 
non-spill events should be considered.
Planners and responders at all levels need to understand the authorities and resources each 
response organization brings to a specific incident. When plans and procedures are 
understood, agencies can support each other effectively. However, each response results 
in new lessons learned which necessitates continuing refinement of the procedures and 
processes, development of better methods, and meshing o f agency needs and actions. 
Because most responses that require an ICS with a UC will be multi-agency and may be 
multi jurisdictional, all participating organizations must understand the complexities of 
coordination. The question is not “Who is in charge?” but “How can all responders work 
together for the best results?” The goal of an ICS is to enhance response efficiency by 
eliminating duplication of effort and lessening response time -  and consequently response 
costs. The best way to reduce confusion and conflict is to anticipate problems and 
develop possible solutions. This requires scenario-based planning and exercises with 
constant communications and coordination among all participants, working together as a 
team.
2.9 An example of ICS
Let’s assume that a large explosion has occurred in a Garments factory which is a 5 
storied building and it collapsed just beside the main road of Dhaka city. In that disaster 
scenario, there are several main groups that can come together to run this event: the local 
police department, the fire department, emergency medical services, public works with 
their heavy lifting capability equipment and rescue support materials and finally the 
garments factory administration. If we believed that there was the potential of a terrorist 
act, these groups would be joined by the CID. All the leaders from these various agencies 
would then group together and gather at a central command post location. Each agency
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(police, fire, public works, school administration, CID etc.) would have its own incident 
command system being established behind their leader. In this manner we would all be 
utilizing the same organizational system, "singing off that same sheet of music", so that 
we could help each other. The Logistics OIC from police could go and talk to the 
Logistics OIC from fire if they were having trouble locating a specific item, like say 
chain-link fence. The PIO's (Public Liaison Officer) from the various agencies could link 
together and run a unified PIO organization and the Intelligence OIC's could all share and 
exchange information that they had gathered.
In order to understand the very fluid concept of "who’s the foreman" in a Unified 
Command event, the concept of a triangle can be used. We can think that the Incident 
Commander's position on the ICS diagram not as a box for a single person, but as a 
triangle comprised of the leaders of all the agencies present. The person who moves to the 
top of the triangle as our "foreman/shot caller /  group leader” is the person whose group 
has the most to do at that given point in time in our management of this event ( that is the 
leading agency). In this scenario of a collapse of a Garments factory, when the event first 
starts, this is primarily a Fire / Rescue / Medical operation. The agency leader that we 
would all look to for guidance and direction would be the fire department’s Incident 
Commander who reached initially on the operational spot. This person would move to the 
top position in the triangle as the initial “shot-caller”.
Figure 2.2: Incident/ Unified Command System Structure for collapse of a Garments
factory
The fire department Incident Commander will set the goals for these initial stages of the 
operation. Their skill and expertise in the handling of the treatment and transport of the
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injured, the rescue of victims who may be trapped and the availability to deal with any 
hazardous materials involved, all speaks to the principle that we as the other agencies in 
the Unified Command should be taking our direction from the Commander who has the 
most skill and knowledge to deal with the event at that given point in time. During the 
time that fire is in the lead position of the Unified Command, this does not mean that law 
enforcement (Police Force) or any of the other agencies involved are sitting around idly 
waiting until fire duties have finished. Local law enforcement, along with all o f the other 
agencies involved, will be responsible for establishing their own incident command 
system to manage this event during the time that the Fire Department is in charge. As the 
fire department's involvement begins to wind down - everyone has been rescued, the fire 
has been put out and the casualties have all been moved from the scene to local area 
hospitals- the next group with the most amount of things to do is the local law 
enforcement agency. The local law enforcement agency now has the most to do and their 
Incident Commander will now move to the top of the triangle and assume duties as the 
group leader.
When Incident Command passes to law enforcement, the law officer in charge will then 
set the goals for the operation, and begin conduct of the preliminary investigation. This 
will include identifying and taking initial statements from potential witnesses and victims, 
along with crime scene preservation, any emergency actions toward suspect 
apprehension, and evidence collection. When the fire department begins to wind down its 
functions of fire-rescue-medical response, the fire and law commanders will agree when 
incident command will pass to law enforcement. When this occurs, simultaneous 
broadcasts should be made on both the fire and law enforcement channels so that all 
personnel understand that incident command has passed from the fire service to law 
enforcement.
Also at this time, the specific location for the command post should be repeated via radio 
so that there is no mistake as to where the command post for this "Unified Command" is 
located. This concept of a change in “who is the group leader” within the Unified 
Command does not mean that the fire department is finished and can leave the scene. 
Yes, their entire operation will wind down greatly and they will need a small fraction of 
the people that they had during the initial stages of the event, but their continued presence 
is vital. Their numbers and equipment may be greatly reduced, but they are still necessary 
for the continuity of information and in the event any fire issues arise. It is essential that
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under the Unified Command concept that a Fire Department officer remain in the 
command post who can direct fire resources if they are needed during this time. As the 
law enforcement mission winds down, assuming that we have not discovered criminal 
involvement in our garments factory explosion, control of the incident will now pass to 
the garments factory administration. The command level person from the garments 
administration would now move to the top of the triangle and become the group leader; 
the setting their goals for the incident and being supported by the other groups in the 
Unified Command.
Again, this does not mean that the local law enforcement or any of the other agencies 
would leave the scene. They would still leave a command level person at the incident 
command post and sufficient forces on scene to handle any kind o f problems that may 
arise in their area of expertise. At some point during the final stages of the incident, the 
participating leaders would need to make a decision as to when the Unified Command 
would be disbanded or demobilized. In general, the Unified Command would be 
disbanded / demobilized when an agreement was reached that the final command agency 
could handle the entire event utilizing its own internal resources. In our example case of 
the garments factory explosion, this would be the garments factory administration. When 
this decision is made within the command group, the Unified Command is broken down 
with all of the other members returning to their normal duties. The emergency stage has 
passed and control of the area would return to the garments factory administration so that 
they can "get back in business" as fast as they can. The garments factory administration 
may elect to keep its on-site staff managing the reorganization and recovery of the 
garments in the already established organizational framework of the Incident Command 
System. As hard as it may be to spare the personnel, their participating group is already 
established using ICS and it is an excellent organizational framework for this huge task. 
They will be able to continue managing the recovery o f the garments utilizing a seamless 
organizational system that can handle all o f the problems that may arise.
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C H A PTER  3
ARMED FORCES AND DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESH
3.1 Evaluation of Organized Disaster M anagement in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a well-known country in the world because of natural disaster. This country 
first time came to the world media for “BHOLA Cyclone” in 1970 that time it was under 
colonial rule of West Pakistan. After Independence again this country came a number of 
times in world media in year 1974 (famine), 1988 Flood, 1988 Cyclone, 1991 Cyclone, 
1997 Cyclone, 1998 Flood,2004 flood and recently in 2007 for Cyclone SIDR and AILA. 
Bangladesh is a breading zone of all kinds of natural disasters. Because of its low land 
and location within the flood plains of three great rivers, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, 
and the Meghna, their tributaries, and distributaries, the country is more vulnerable to 
floods. The conical shape of the Bay of Bengal is the breeding ground for tropical 
cyclones and Bangladesh is the worst victim in terms of fatalities and economic losses 
incurred. The global distribution of cyclones shows that only 1% of all the cyclones that 
form every year strike Bangladesh, but, unfortunately, the fatalities they cause are 53% of 
the whole world total.
The country has a long history of seismic activity related to its proximity to the 
Himalayas. Three great earthquakes of magnitudes exceeding 8 were felt in 1897, 1934, 
and 1950, and another four earthquakes exceeding magnitude 7 were felt between 1869 
and 1950. Major seismic sources are the Meghalaya (8.0), Tripura (7.0), Sub-Dauki (7.3), 
and Bogra (7.0), all o f them are associated with earthquakes of expected magnitudes 
higher than or equal to 7.0. At present the country is at risk o f an earthquake in any time. 
The Government of Bangladesh started its development process in disaster management 
by issuing Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) in 1972. At that time the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Ministry was there to assist government in case o f natural disaster. After 
forming up o f Armed forces division in year 1983, they participated in natural disaster as 
a combined force (Army, Navy and Air force). Before hand, the participation of defense 
was not as organized as it is now. The 1988 flood was successfully mitigated with the 
present system. But the intensity of Cyclone 1991 was the beyond capacity of the new 
government of BNP. Thereafter it felt necessary to formulate a combined national 
programme on disaster management. The government of Bangladesh could successfully 
published The Standing Orders on Disaster in the current format in 1997 in Bangla. It was 
modified and translated in English in 1999. There after basing on the Hyogo Framework
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of Action 2005-15 and the SAARC Framework of Action 2006-15, the SOD was again 
revised in 2010. After the cyclone in 1991 the Government also formed up Ministry of 
Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) which is the national focal point for disaster 
management in Bangladesh. And the earlier Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry was 
incorporated under a directorate in it. Now the Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management (MoFDM) manages disasters through its three agencies: Disaster 
Management Bureau (DMB), Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation (DRR), and 
Directorate General of Food. In the development process the Government devises the 
disaster management plan which involves the union chairman to Prime Minister from 
union to National level. This plan formulates various committees in each and every 
administrational level. Beside that the government of Bangladesh published draft disaster 
management Act, disaster management policy etc. At present Bangladesh has established 
its credibility in global context because of successfully incorporating its all government 
agencies, ministries, Armed Forces and NGO’s to mitigate the disaster and strengthen the 
resilience of its population.
3.2 Bangladesh Armed Forces in Present Disaster M anagement Context
In disaster situations, relief, rescue and response operations have to be undertaken 
immediately and in the most appropriate manner. The development oriented civil 
administration in our country is still not well equipped for undertaking large scale 
disaster response activities in the event of major and wide spread disasters. But like many 
other countries, Bangladesh Armed Forces are always in a state of operational readiness 
to move quickly to any disaster affected area and their ability to work under adverse 
ground & climatic conditions is of immense help to any civil authority during disaster 
situations. Bangladesh Armed Forces are one of the most dedicated, professional and 
modernized armed forces in the world. So far in Bangladesh the role played by the Armed 
Forces during disaster rescue and response operations has been exemplary. Just after the 
independence the Bangladesh defense force didn’t have any combined organization, 
because of the strength and composition the army enjoyed the superiority over Navy and 
Air force. But there was no existence of well defined defense mechanism under which 
these three forces can jointly take part in any operation. In year 1983 in the regime of 
General Ershad, the Armed Forces division (AFD) first established. And it made a 
flexibility and well defined command and control over three forces to engage in natural 
disaster under the supreme command of the then president ( at present under command of 
Prime Minister). Armed Forces were serving for the nation with their sincerity and full of
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dedication during the flood 1988 and the subsequent natural disasters like Cyclone 1991, 
Tornado 1996 in Tangail district, Cyclone 1997, Flood 2004 and Cyclone Sidr in 2007. 
Beside this devastating national level disaster the Armed Forces work all the year round 
in Aid of Civil Power to assists government in case of water crisis in summer or building 
collapse or fire break out. They work with the civil defense force and other government 
ministries as a supporting role. The Armed Forces also engaged in Vulnerable Group 
Feeding Assistance (VGF) to assist the government in post flood relief activities i.e. VGF 
Programme. As a part of that VGF programme the Armed Forces deployed in various 
parts of Bangladesh from 20 August 2006 and assisted the civil authority in verification 
of list, distribution of card, and ration distribution in all unions of Bangladesh (64 
districts).
Since the independency the Bangladesh Armed Forces achieved a long experience for 
working with government ministries and other agencies in emergency response. It can be 
mentioned here that the Armed Forces experienced itself for working with NGOs at a 
larger scale during Operation Sea Angles in 1991 cyclone. But till the publication of 
revised SOD 2010 the Armed Forces doesn’t have any written authority to work with 
NGOs even though they work with them unofficially and temporary basis. In a Country 
like Bangladesh, it is very important to accumulate all the government and non 
government agencies as an emergency responder. And thereby ICS is the best possible 
method for implementing this process.
3.3 Civil -  Military Relationship in Bangladesh
In the recent time the Bangladesh Government has incorporated ICS in the disaster 
management system in Bangladesh. The ICS needs a well coordinated and comprehensive 
approach by all agencies who will be working mutually in this system. And it depends on 
strong relation in the midst of the agencies. In our country the relation between military 
administration with civil which includes political group, NGOs and civil administration is 
essential to know for formulating a logical and workable action framework for the Armed 
Forces in ICS context .Bangladesh achieved its independence after a bloody war against 
Pakistan in year 1971. Just after four years of its emergence on the map of South Asia it 
witnessed blood coup and counter coup both successful and abortive mutinies of Army 
soldiers and Non-commissioned officers against their senior officers the brutal 
assassination of its great leader Bongobondhu Sheikh Mujibor Rahaman as well as 
President Ziaur Rahman and execution of large number of political leaders and military 
officers since 1975. These turmoil situations made this country unstable and slowed down
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the progress o f development. The corruption and weakness o f political leaders made the 
military ambition high and created scope for military intervention many times in state 
mechanism. As a result this country could enjoy the democratic environment from 1972- 
1975 and four months of Sattar’s regime and after 9 years o f Military dictatorship of 
General Ershad again this country could enjoy the democratic environment from 1991 to 
2006. Finally this country witnessed another military intervene in terms of Caretaker 
government in year 2007-08. At present this country again entered in democratic 
governmental system. Since independence most of the time this country was ruled by 
military dictatorship. As a result it creates overall negative impact on the civil society. 
The civil society includes the political group, civil administration and humanitarian 
agencies. So civil-military relationship needs further explanation which has been 
described in the following manner.
3.3.1 Relation between Political Group and Civil-M ilitary 
Administration
Bangladesh as a state lived in a military regime more than the democratic government 
from its independence. As a result the level of institutionalization of political parties and 
the functioning of democratic institutions were greatly upset. The Zia regime witnessed 
the ascendance of the military and the civil bureaucracy over the political elements. The 
bureaucratic elite who ruled Bangladesh, during the undivided Pakistan period and 
seemed to have lost its esprit de corps and relegated to second position and dominance in 
decision making arena. In order to restore the power and position of the steel frame, the 
new regime first abolished Presidential Order No.9 of 1972, which had provided for the 
dismissal o f officials without assigning any reason. Furthermore many bureaucrats who 
had lost their job under this order in Mujib’s regime were placed in many key positions 
by Zia’s regime. The bureaucrats in Zia’s regime were given the responsibility for 
formulating of various development strategy and policies. Since then all the key policy -  
making institutions were dominated by them. The military personals were involved in Aid 
of Civil power in Mujib’s regime and found political leaders were involved with 
smuggling and corruption. This created dissatisfaction among the military personals 
towards political leaders at the very initial stage and it affected in a long run. During 
military regime the military and civil bureaucracy run the country avoiding the 
development of political parties and the creation of nation builders political leaders. This 
generates a generation vacuum for achieving a high-quality political leader for this nation; 
at the same time it creates a mistrust and lack of confidence among the political group 
towards military and civil bureaucracy. On one hand the military and civil bureaucracy
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has less trust and respect towards politics, constitution and democracy, on the other hand 
the political parties were indulge themselves in politicized these elite groups to gain 
support from these elite groups to grasp the state power. As a result the relations turned in 
to a bad shape and which only created mistrust and suspicion among them. Still at present 
the relation of Military and civil administration with political groups has yet to develop.
3.3.2 Relation of Civil and Military administration
In Zia’s regime the civil bureaucratic regained their power and achieved all the key 
position of the decision making institutions. In the overall power structure, the positions 
of the President, CMLA, DCMLA and the advisers to the President were crucial and 80 
percent of them were held by the bureaucratic elite. Apart from this crucial positions held 
by the bureaucratic elite by 1980 former CSP officers numerically dominated most of the 
high level decision making posts of all major government institutions concerned with 
administration and economic management, including the highest key policy making 
institution like National Economic Council(NEC) and planning commission. Apart from 
this they were also placed in most of the top positions in the secretariat and public 
corporations. This country became almost an administrative state in Zia’s regime. Where 
the civil- military bureaucracy ruled over the country and it turned into a praetorian 
model. After Zia’s assassination, General Ershad took the charge o f the country and 
ignored the general notion that the military elite can’t run a country without the 
collaboration of the civil services. In Ershad regime in Bangladesh represented a unique 
example in the sense that it was often called a “Parliament of soldiers”. The young 
officers from army were significantly participated in policy deliberations with senior 
officers and sometimes initiated policies. Under Martial law authorities, the maximum 
key positions of the governmental structures were captured by the military personal in all 
level of administration from the civil bureaucrats and they have no power on their hand. 
However some of the key cabinet positions like Finance and Planning, Agriculture and 
Industry were given to leading bureaucrats. This changing o f power and control over the 
administration create frustration and dissatisfaction among the civil bureaucratic elite 
towards military administration. Thereby military administration creates another rivalry 
group against them. Since the regime of Ershad the civil administration lost their power 
over administration and maximum important positions were infiltrated by military 
bureaucrats is which still exists in present democratic government period.
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The relation between military and civil administration was not healthy in Bangladesh. But 
at present the situation is changing. Because of natural disaster the Armed forces has 
deployed several times to play as a supportive role for the civil administration which 
creates a better understanding among them. At the same time the present military 
administration is now quite matured and professional more so serving in UN 
peacekeeping mission they gained lot of experience on working with civil administration. 
This experience helped them to create a healthy and comfortable relation with civil 
administration. On the other hand the close relation during in Aid o f civil power removed 
the misconception of civil administration regarding military administration which they 
had received from their successors.
3.3.3 Relation between NG O ’s and Military Administration
NGOs are defined as “private organizations which conduct and pursue activities to relieve 
sufferings, promote the interests of poor, provide basic social services or undertake 
community development”. In wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any non 
profiting organization which is independent from the government. Based on their 
functioning NGOs can be divided in two distinct categories.
• Operational NGOs Such organizations work for the betterment of 
humanity through practical application of their resources and abilities. They under 
take welfare measures, development projects and assists the governments and its 
agencies in rises management.
• Advocacy NGOs This type of NGOs is more focused and deals with a 
specific purpose with a view to defend and promote a particular cause. Commonly 
dealt issues are health, education and poverty. At times a no of advocacy NGOs 
may unite under a single operational NGO while advocating their particular 
cause. Physical application usually is not within the domain of such types. 
Operational NGOs find their roots in masses on contrary to the other type.
Their role in disaster management is of paramount importance. These can further be 
classified as under.
• Community Based Organizations These are normally membership 
organizations made up of a group of individuals who have joined together 
to further their own interests. Normally based on communal system such 
organizations are weak in resources and funds with prime dependence on 
charity and donations. However, having grass root foundations, if linked
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with the two types being described below, communal organizations can be 
very effective.
• National Organizations Well financed and sufficiently equipped 
such organizations have national objectives. They primarily focus within 
the boundaries of a particular country, although at times may have 
international links. BRAC is the glaring examples.
International Organizations Normally based in developed countries 
such organizations operate around the world particularly the developing 
countries. They have a wider scope and are linked to world fame bodies as 
UNO and World Bank. At times they play an intermediary role between 
these organizations, governments and small scaled NGOs.
Basing on their contribution to humankind during emergency response the NGO has got 
both the positive and negative attributes. These are discussed as follows:
Positive Attributes
• Strong Grass Root Links Gaining their strength from the masses these 
organizations are well linked in their areas of influence. Moreover, their selfless 
approach and unpaid working help them gain the sympathies of people.
• Innovative and Adaptable In most cases NGOs do not have a set agenda to 
operate. Their basic aim being to serve humanity they are capable to undertake 
varying nature of tasks.
• Sincerity o f  Purpose At occasions NGOs are blamed to have secondary 
objectives of self propagation. In certain cases it might be true, however, the basic 
purpose to serve humanity remains in built to any NGO.
• Expertise NGOs are usually well trained and have requisite expertise to 
apply their resources. They have the specialized man power and technical know 
how to implement their objectives.
• Cost Effective Charity and donations forms the base of their finances. This very 
system, make these outfits highly productive with almost negligible input.
Negative Attributes
• Limited Institutional Capacity In most cases the scope of NGOs 
particularly at national level and below does not match their organizational 
abilities. Their intended tasks are usually not within their own capabilities and
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they normally need outside assistance from the government and local 
establishment.
• Resource and Financial Constraint Small scaled NGOs normally do not have 
sufficient funds and resources to manage their affairs. Absence of a regular source 
of income and mere dependence on donors and charity are their vulnerabilities. 
Isolated Working NGOs are very weak in inter communication and 
coordinated working, either with the government or with their fellow 
organizations. They have their own agenda and work with a particular mind set. 
In large scale disasters duplication and wastage of efforts are therefore a common 
doing.
• Limited Field Sustainability Dealing with disasters at occasions require 
prolonged field employment. The associated staffs of NGOs are normally not 
permanent. They are linked to some other jobs for their regular incomes. Long 
term employment of NGOs for field work is therefore a problem.
• Compatible Understanding Their direction and way o f working is self 
assessed. They usually lack understanding of the broader social and economic 
context. The problem arises when they have to operate in coordination with the 
government and its agencies. Their limited focus and inability to view the overall 
framework not only limits their own output but is also a drag on others.
In Bangladesh the military administration has no direct link up with the NGOs. Although 
the NGOs are often identified with powerless groups, they themselves have become 
powerful and influential, especially because of their external source of financial support, 
cooperation and advocacy. In country like Bangladesh the numbers of registered NGOs 
are about 23000 and some of which are the largest and best known in the world. During 
emergency response operation most of the time the NGOs work independently. It has 
been found that they have rich database on their respective community and area where the 
governmental agencies don’t have. They enjoyed better communication and sound 
management than that of Government one. Earlier stage the Government didn’t integrate 
the NGOs in disaster management activities. As a result there was no scope for the Armed 
forces to come across with NGOs. But recently the donor countries increased their fund to 
local NGOs and the bilateral agencies from developed countries like Canadian 
International Developed Agency (CIDA), Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation, Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA) and Danish 
Agency for Development Assistance are increasingly in favor of working with local 
NGOs in developing countries. In Bangladesh many of these influential bilateral agencies
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which used to have direct relationship with the government are now in favor o f in 
pursuing their objectives through local NGOs in sectors like development sustainability 
of the community by decreasing primary education, health care, capacity building, gender 
issue and the environment. The present scenario influences the government mechanism to 
incorporate the NGOs in disaster management plan. As a result it will create the scope for 
the Armed forces to work with the NGOs in upcoming days. But still in Armed forces 
they have some misconception or mistrust against NGOs activities and some of the 
members of the Armed forces has fear that working with NGOs may disclose the 
informational security to foreign countries or the NGOs may not have that capability or 
knowledge on disaster management. At present the NGOs are monitored and their 
activities are observed through NGO Affairs Bureau which established in 1990 and it is 
directly under Prime Minister Office. It also controls the registration of new NGOs in 
Bangladesh
3.7 Challenges for Implementation of ICS in Bangladesh
In incident command system (ICS) when the military administration will be going to 
work with the other agencies like the political group, civil administration or the NGOs 
during emergency operation they may face problems or limitations due to various 
reservation and challenges which has been described in the following sections.
3.7.1 Political groups
The long term military dictatorship, suppression of political parties and lack of respect 
towards political leader by the member of armed forces made the situation a conspicuous 
one at early stage o f this country. Lack of knowledge on constitution, confidence on 
democratic governmental system and high ambitious inspires the military bureaucratic 
group to snatch power and intervene in politics number of time. This how on the long run 
it affects the political parties to grow misconception and mistrust against the military 
administration. In case of emergency situation may be related to natural disaster, the 
government political party suffered indecision because of fear of military intervenes to 
call for emergency during disaster. This delayed the emergency response operation in 
time and increased the sufferings and number of victims. And at the same time the Armed 
forces suffered from lack of confidence and loose its credibility to the nation. Again in 
planning the mistrust may lead the government political party to set the responsibility of 
the Armed forces in a manner that their services may not be better utilized. So to 
minimize those problems the Armed Forces must show its full respect towards the
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democratic governmental system as well as the political elected representative. The 
Armed forces must have the confidence on the political system. And the professionalism 
of Armed forces personnel’s will enable the political leader to have trust on Armed forces 
in emergency situation or any crisis time.
3.7.2 Civil Administration during Emergency Response Operation
We have all ready discussed the relation between civil military administrations in our 
country. Beside this issue both the administrations also having some institutional 
limitations which hinder the development progress during emergency response operation. 
One of the common and problematic issues between military and civil administration in 
developed and developing countries is command, control and co-ordination authority 
especially in joint operation during emergency response operation. The command, control 
and co-ordination authority may vary due to government structural but it exists almost in 
all the countries. In our SOD 2010 the command, control and co-ordination definition has 
given as follows
• Command The direction of members and resources of an agency in 
the performance of that agency’s role and tasks. Command relates to 
agencies and operates vertically within an agency. Authority to command 
is established in legislation or by agreement within an agency.
Control The overall direction of disaster response activities in an
emergency or disaster situation. Control relates to situations and operates 
horizontally across agencies. Authority for control is established in 
legislation or in a response plan, and carries with it the responsibility for 
tasking other agencies in accordance with the needs of the situation.
• Coordination The bringing together of agencies and resources to ensure 
an effective disaster response. It is primarily concerned with the 
systematic acquisition and application of resources (organizational, 
personnel and equipment) in accordance with the requirements imposed 
by the hazard or impact of an emergency. It operates vertically within 
agencies as a function of the authority to command, and horizontally 
across agencies as a function of the authority to control.
At present existing governmental structure which creates challenges for the Armed Forces 
while working with civil administration during emergency response. These challenges are 
shown on the following table:
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Table-3.1: The Challenges between Armed Forces and Civil Administration
Ser
N o
C hallenges D escription R em arks
01 Sharing resources 
with civil 
administration
There is no system in place for acquiring 
private resources (equipment, supplies 
manpower etc) by Armed Forces under 
normal civil law even when the Armed 
forces are deployed In Aid of Civil 
Power act and there is a severe need to 
help victims during emergency response.
02 Lack of
coordination with 
civil administration
(1) Not necessarily government agencies 
or civil society agencies follow orders 
from the AFD under normal civil law 
during placement of government 
Officers under military commander or in 
other type of resource allocation, 
distribution etc..
03 Lack of database 
and need for 
accessing data 
bases of 
Government 
ministries
(1) At present no comprehensive data 
base is available to AFD and still there is 
no such system developed by which the 
civil and military or Armed Forces can 
exchange and share their database each 
other.
(2) AFD does not have access to the 
databases of other government agencies
04 Lack of proper 
methodologies for 
damage /need 
assessment
AFD officials are usually called upon to 
undertake rapid assessments soon after 
the disaster events. AFD does not follow 
any standard methodology for damage 
and need assessment and assessments are 
made very arbitrarily. The assessments 
method also not same with the concern 
ministries as well
05 No methodology for
vulnerability
assessment
AFD professionals do not have any 
standard methodology for vulnerability 
assessment for buildings and other 
critical infrastructures and they don’t 
follow any similar process with the 
concern ministries
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3.7.3 Setback between Armed Forces and Civil Administration 
during emergency operation
In emergency operation the Armed Forces and civil administration in our country are 
almost habituated with the experience of working together. Even though sometime we 
faced difficulties some of the arena which mentioned bellows
• Some of the case it has been found the military intervention creates 
negative impact on cooperation between civil and military administration.
• The way o f working style some time creates misunderstanding to the civil 
authority.
• The lack of maturity of young military officers in dealing with the civil 
officers creates misconception towards military administration.
• In democratic government structure it is the civil administration that will 
have the supremacy over the military administration during emergency 
response operation, but due to attitude of the military officers and lack of 
well defined action frame work create misunderstanding.
The different type of command structure sometime becomes a barrier to 
understand each other.
• The use of different type of communication also create problem to take 
necessary joint approach during emergency operations.
3.7.4 Organizational Structure between Armed Forces and 
Humanitarian agencies (NGO)
Military institutions place a high value on command and control, top-down 
hierarchical organizational structures and clear lines o f authority, discipline and 
accountability. They place great value on logistics, and substantial resources are 
dedicated to the acquisition o f assets and training o f personnel to ensure that they can 
function independently under the most adverse circumstances. The military’s 
approach to problem solving is generally directive and coercive. Humanitarian 
organizations are less hierarchical and more participatory in their style o f decision 
making and operations than the military. They pay more attention to the process by 
which they accomplish operations, partly because they attach more importance to 
long-term impacts, but have fewer back-up resources and engage in less contingency 
planning to ensure that short-term objectives can be met quickly. These structural 
differences are particularly evident in the distinct approaches o f the military and
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civilian organizations to direct civilian assistance. The m ilitary’s approach is 
informed by security rather than long-term development considerations. For instance, 
military infrastructure projects for the local civilian populations rarely consider the 
long-term management implications o f what they construct or repair. Rather, such 
.civil affairs projects. (As they have been known in the United Kingdom and the 
United States) are essentially public relations exercises designed to reap hearts and 
minds returns to further a security objective. Thus the military short-term, non- 
participatory approach is often a source o f operational tension with the civilian 
agencies engaged in similar activities informed by considerations o f development
• Military command and control (C2) Military C2 is fundamentally a 
support instrument. It is designed as a coordination platform that vests 
significant decision-making power in commanders, intended to enable them to 
efficiently and successfully complete a mission or attain an objective. Military 
C2 is a structured, tightly coupled, hierarchical environment where concepts, 
such as command, repeat at different layers o f hierarchy, though with changes 
in span of control, i.e. how many staff one commands, or in scope, i.e. from 
tactical to strategic. The key to success is swift, efficient, and cost-effective 
victory. While the actual definition of victory varies, it is generally considered 
to be changing enemy’s behavior. It is also commonly accepted that the best 
way to overcome an enemy is by attacking its strategy. This approach frames 
military C2 in a temporal structure that is typically longer than is required for 
disaster response.
• Civilian command and control Civilian C2 is fundamentally a 
functional instrument. It is designed as a tool to maintain authority with 
emphasis on distributed decision-making that is intended to provide ample 
leeway for prevailing local customs, cultures, and needs. While there is an 
implied hierarchy, there is no formal overarching hierarchical organization and 
the relationships are loosely coupled. The hierarchy is typically enforced 
through financial bonds, treaties, lawsuits, bureaucratic controls, or through 
specific umbrella organizations created for a particular purpose. The key to 
success of civilian C2 is considered to be the full realization of the democratic 
process. While efficiency is desired, it is not the first priority and is often 
overshadowed by the desire to encourage debate and collaboration, as well as 
the goal of insuring participant equity and equal treatment. This approach also
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frames the civilian C2 in a temporal structure that is typically longer than is 
required for disaster response.
3.7.5 Conflict between Military and NGOs in Emergency Response 
Operations
During humanitarian missions, humanitarian aid agencies and militaries share the 
common goal of getting the right amount of relief supplies to the right place at the right 
time. Even though both the elements face some troubles, which are mentioned bellow:
• Duration In disaster prone area the military or Armed Forces are 
deployed for short time duration and they have limited objectives. On the other 
hand the NGOs are working in an area for a long duration which enables them to 
understand the need assessment better than that of Armed Forces. The NGOs 
know better than the Armed Forces regarding “What, When and How the relief 
materials are needed by the affected people”. Some case it has been found the 
Armed Forces couldn’t utilize the NGOs properly for better management of relief 
distribution.
• Control Sometime the Armed Forces try to control the NGOs work 
without having clear idea on their activities. The NGOs work basing on some 
limited agendas and particular field of development project like sanitation, 
primary education, capacity building or health care etc. As an example during 
emergency response the Armed Forces may instruct the local NGOs to utilize 
their all effort to provide drinkable water, as they figure it out as priority one but 
the NGOs may not have the water purification plants as they were engaged with 
the gender issue project in that local area.
• Willingness Some of the NGOs work under direct supervision of donor 
countries and agencies they may not have the spirit or willingness to work with 
the government agencies including Armed forces. And it sometimes create 
difficulties in relief distribution because lack of cooperation in same area.
• Cheap popularity Some of the NGOs mainly work for cheap 
popularity with limited resources and they create critical situation during relief 
distribution some time in rescue and evacuation also.
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3.7.6 Line of Communication
In emergency response operation Military and civil organization maintained different 
pattern of communication to maintain their flow of information, report and returns from 
command level to downwards. The military mainly posses high, sophisticated and 
secured equipment to maintain their command information from command level to 
downwards. And both the administration used different terminology in their daily 
functions to maintain their C2 and radio conversation as well. The military mainly 
maintain their communication following the battle procedure and specific encrypted data 
which is not accessible by any civil administration because of its high classified value. On 
the other hand the military are not trained and they have no scope or training to have the 
accessibility in the civil administration communication system. Again the humanitarian 
agencies got their own way to manage the communication system. In Bangladesh most of 
the humanitarian agencies are depended on the cell phone network and walki talki with 
limited range.
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C H A PTER  4
CASE STUDY ON ICS IN DEVELOPED AND 
____________________ DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CONTEXT
4.1 ICS in Developed countries
In developed countries they are having well emergency management structured but in 
case of emergency response it has been observed that the whole system was not activated 
the way it should be. Several gaps are discovered later on specially the lack of define 
command and control authority, lack of good management system and duplication in 
relief distribution or evacuation and rescue plan. So they introduced the Incident 
Command System (ICS) in their disaster management process. And try to bring all the 
emergency responder in a same chain. And now it is successfully followed by all the 
developed countries like USA, Canada and Australia. In the developed countries context 
the ICS is mainly handled by the emergency service provider like Fire department or the 
civil administration. They are well experienced and trained to manage the disaster. When 
the entire civil administration couldn’t handle the disaster with own capability they called 
the Armed Forces as a supporting role. Like Hurricane KATRINA or RITA in USA. In 
developed countries the civil infrastructure for managing any kind of disaster is strong 
and more capable than developing countries. So it gives less scope to Armed Forces to 
involve in the business. And well practice of democracy and democratic government 
structure made their civil organization more strong to handle the crisis. The following 
section the ICS of developed countries will be discussed.
4.1.1 Incident Command System in USA
The United States has got a large jurisdictional area compromises with 50 states and these 
states again divided into countries, cities, Township and villages. Some of the cities also 
part of the more than one area of jurisdiction. So the political division makes it more 
complicated during a natural or man made disaster for emergency responding when it 
includes more than one state or area of jurisdiction. Again Natural disasters (particularly 
earthquakes and hurricanes) have clearly demonstrated that no jurisdiction has sufficient 
emergency services to handle large-scale emergencies within their own resources. Even 
“sm air emergencies frequently involve multiple departments from within either a single 
jurisdiction or assistance from adjacent mutual aid departments. To overcome this 
problem the USA government took the initiative for arranging some coordination or 
integrated approach between the states or more than one area of jurisdiction. So they
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arrange some agreement like “Mutual Aid” in between states or the different areas of 
Jurisdiction for swift emergency management.
4.1.1.1 Mutual Aid
Although there had long been a general awareness that emergencies could easily 
overcome the internal resources of even the largest state, this key component of 
emergency preparedness had been handled in an unstructured fashion until relatively 
recently in the United States. “Mutual Aid” as used in the United States refers to a formal 
compact between jurisdictions that define the emergency services that the supporting 
jurisdiction(s) are willing to provide, the terms for reimbursement for services provided, 
and the legal authorities of the first responders when serving outside their home 
jurisdictions. The mutual aid compacts normally provide that a first responder working 
outside o f his/her jurisdiction in the requesting host jurisdiction holds the same authority 
as a local first responder in the host jurisdiction and enjoys the same liability protection 
that they have when “in territory.” Thus, an Emergency Medical Technician or Firefighter 
from Maryland responding to an emergency in Virginia would have the same legal status 
as a Virginia Emergency Medical Technician or Firefighter. The most frequent exception 
to this general policy concerns law enforcement authority: special provisions are required 
when a police officer is working outside of his/her home state. Where routine cross 
border cooperation is anticipated, officers are frequently certified in both states. In the 
Washington, DC metropolitan area supporting police officers are individually deputized 
as US Marshals to grant them law enforcement authority in the host jurisdiction. 
Standardized, properly executed, and practiced, mutual aid systems are now recognized as 
essential. Bilateral mutual aid agreements, particularly involving fire departments, 
between adjacent jurisdictions, have been in place for many years. Many local 
jurisdictions have agreements in place, but they vary widely across the country. 
Moreover, many are not formal agreements, and do not addresses key issues such as 
liability and compensation or qualification portability. Basing on the experience and 
evaluation of the Mutual Aid process the USA government finally established the 
National Incident Management System.
4.1.1.2 The U.S. National Incident Management System
In March, 2004, the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a 
mandatory, nationwide, National Incident Management System (“NIMS”). NIMS were 
issued February 28, 2003 under the authority of Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD)-5. “HSPD-5 requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS 
and use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, 
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation programs and activities, as well as in 
support o f those actions taken to assist State, local, or tribal entities. The directive also 
requires Federal departments and agencies to make adoption o f the NIM S by State, tribal, 
and local organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance beginning in FY 
2005.” (U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, 2004, cover letter by Secretary Tom 
Ridge) NIMS supplements, rather than replaces, the National Response Plan (NRP), and 
regional, State, and local response plans. The NIMS has two fundamental principles: (1) 
the system must be flexible, so that it can be used routinely by all types o f domestic 
incidents, regardless o f their cause, size, location or complexity; and (2) where 
appropriate, highly structured, standardized operational structures (U.S. Department o f 
Homeland Security, 2004).There is a brief summary o f emergency management roles at 
the local, tribal, State, and Federal levels, as well as the roles o f private-sector 
organizations has been given. Emergency management is the coordination and integration 
o f all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, 
protect against, respond to, recover from, or militate against threatened or actual natural 
disasters, acts o f terrorism, or other manmade disasters.
4.1.1.3 Local Governments
Resilient communities begin with prepared individuals and depend on the leadership and 
engagement o f local government, NGOs, and the private sector. Individuals, families, and 
caregivers to those with special needs should enhance their awareness o f risk and threats, 
develop household emergency plans that include care for pets and service animals, and 
prepare emergency supply kits. Individuals can also volunteer in their communities. Local 
police, fire, emergency medical services, public health and medical providers, emergency 
management, public works, environmental response professionals, and others in the 
community are often the first to detect a threat or hazard, or respond to an incident. They also 
are often the last to leave an incident site or otherwise to cope with the effects o f an incident. 
The local senior elected or appointed official (the mayor, city manager, or county manager) is 
responsible for ensuring the public safety and welfare of residents.
4.1.1.4 States, Territories, and Tribal Governments
States, territories, and tribal governments have responsibility for the public health and 
welfare o f the people in their jurisdiction. State and local governments are closest to those 
impacted by incidents, and have always had the lead in response and recovery. During 
response, States play a key role coordinating resources and capabilities throughout the 
State and obtaining resources and capabilities from other States. States are sovereign 
entities, and the Governor has responsibility for public safety and welfare. While U.S. 
territories and tribal governments also have sovereign rights, there are unique factors 
involved in working with these entities. States have significant resources o f their own, 
including State emergency management and homeland security agencies, State police, 
health agencies, transportation agencies, incident management teams, specialized teams, 
and the National Guard. The role o f the State government in response is to supplement 
local efforts before, during, and after incidents. If a State anticipates that its resources 
may be exceeded, the Governor can request assistance from the Federal Government 
and/or from other States through mutual aid and assistance agreements such as the 
Emergency M anagement Assistance Compact (EMAC).
4.1.1.5 The Federal Government
The Federal Government maintains a wide array o f  capabilities and resources that can be 
made available upon request o f the Governor. When an incident occurs that exceeds or is 
anticipated to exceed State, tribal, or local resources, the Federal Government may 
provide resources and capabilities to support the State response. For incidents involving 
primary Federal jurisdiction or authorities (e.g., on a military base or a Federal facility or 
lands), Federal departments or agencies may be the first responders and first line o f 
defense, coordinating activities with State, territorial, tribal, and local partners. The 
Federal Government also maintains working relationships with the private sector and 
NGOs.
4.1.1.6 The Private Sector and NGOs
The private sector and NGOs contribute to response efforts through engaged partnerships 
with each level o f government. Private-sector organizations and NGOs are encouraged to 
develop contingency plans and to work with State and local planners to ensure that their 
plans are consistent with pertinent plans, the NIMS, and this Framework. Private-sector 
organizations play an essential role in protecting critical infrastructure systems and 
implementing plans for the rapid restoration o f normal commercial activities and critical
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infrastructure operations in the event o f disruption. The protection o f critical 
infrastructure and the ability to rapidly restore normal commercial activities can mitigate 
the impact o f an incident, improve the quality o f  life o f individuals, and accelerate the 
pace o f recovery for communities and the Nation. There are not-for-profit 
owners/operators o f  critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) facilities, notably in 
healthcare and power generation. NGOs also serve a vital role at the local, State, and 
national levels by performing essential service missions in times o f need. They provide 
sheltering, emergency food supplies, and other vital support services. NGOs bolster and 
support government efforts at all levels
4.1.1.7 During Emergency Response
When notified o f a threat or an incident that potentially requires a coordinated Federal 
response, the National Operations Center (NOC) evaluates the information and notifies 
appropriate senior Federal officials and Federal operations centers: the National Response 
Coordination Center (NRCC), the FBI SIOC (Strategic Information and Operations 
Center), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Military 
Command Center. The NOC serves as the primary coordinating center for these and other 
operations centers. The NOC alerts department and agency leadership to critical 
information to inform decision making. Based on that information, the Secretary o f 
Homeland Security coordinates with other appropriate departments and agencies to 
activate plans and applicable coordination structures o f the Framework as required. 
Officials should be prepared to participate, either in person or by secure video 
teleconference, with departments or agencies involved in responding to the incident. The 
NOC maintains the common operating picture that provides overall situational awareness 
for incident information. Each Federal department and agency must ensure that its 
response personnel are trained to utilize these tools.
4.1.1.8 Operations Centers
Federal operations centers maintain active situational awareness and communications 
within and among Federal department and agency regional, district, and sector offices 
across the country. These operations centers are often connected with their State, tribal, 
and local counterparts, and can exchange information and draw and direct resources in the 
event o f an incident.
4.1.1.9 Baseline Priorities
When an incident or potential incident occurs, responders assess the situation, identify 
and prioritize requirements, and activate available resources and capabilities to save lives, 
protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. In most cases, this 
includes development o f incident objectives based on incident priorities, development o f 
an Incident Action Plan by the Incident Commander in the field, and development o f 
support plans by the appropriate local, tribal, State, and/or Federal Government entities. 
Key activities include:
• Activating people, resources, and capabilities. Across all levels, initial actions 
may include activation o f people and teams and establishment o f incident 
management and response structures to organize and coordinate an effective 
response. The resources and capabilities deployed and the activation o f supporting 
incident management structures should be directly related to the size, scope, 
nature, and complexity o f the incident. All responders should maintain and 
regularly exercise notification systems and protocols.
• Requesting additional resources and capabilities. Responders and capabilities 
may be requested through mutual aid and assistance agreements, the State, or the 
Federal Government. For all incidents, especially large-scale incidents, it is 
essential to prioritize and clearly communicate incident requirements so that 
resources can be efficiently matched, typed, and mobilized to support operations.
• Identifying needs and pre-positioning resources. When planning for heightened 
threats or in anticipation o f large-scale incidents, local or tribal jurisdictions,
States, or the Federal Government should anticipate resources and capabilities 
that may be needed. Based on asset availability, resources should be pre­
positioned and response teams and other support resources may be placed on alert 
or deployed to a staging area. As noted above, mobilization and deployment will 
be most effective when supported by planning that includes pre-scripted mission 
assignments, advance readiness contracting, and staged resources.
4.1.1.10 Tribal, and State Actions
In the event of, or in anticipation of, an incident requiring a coordinated response, local, 
tribal, and State jurisdictions should:
• Identify staff for deployment to the emergency operations center (EO C ), which 
should have standard procedures and call-down lists to notify department and 
agency points o f contact.
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• Work with emergency m anagement officials to take the necessary steps to provide 
for continuity o f operations.
Activate Incident Management Teams (IMTs) as required. IMTs are incident 
command organizations made up o f the command and general staff members and 
appropriate functional units o f an Incident Command System organization. The 
level o f training and experience o f the IMT members, coupled with the identified 
formal response requirements and responsibilities o f the IMT, are factors in 
determining the “type,” or level, o f the IMT.
• Activate specialized response teams as required. Jurisdictions may have 
specialized teams including search and rescue teams, crime scene investigators, 
public works teams, hazardous materials response teams, public health specialists, 
or veterinarians/animal response teams.
• Activate mutual aid and assistance agreements as required.
4.1.1.11 Federal Actions
In the event of, or in anticipation of, an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, 
the National Operations Center, in many cases acting through the National Response 
Coordination Center, notifies other Federal departments and agencies o f  the situation and 
specifies the level o f activation required. After being notified, departments and agencies 
should:
• Identify and mobilize staff to fulfill their departm ent’s or agency’s 
responsibilities, including identifying appropriate subject-m atter experts and other 
staff to support department operations centers.
Identify staff for deployment to the NOC, the NRCC, FEMA Regional Response 
Coordination Centers (RRCCs), or other operations centers as needed, such as the 
FBI’s Joint Operations Center. These organizations have standard procedures and 
call-down lists, and will notify department or agency points o f contact if 
deployment is necessary.
• Identify staff that can be dispatched to the Joint Field Office (JFO), including 
Federal officials representing those departments and agencies with specific 
authorities, lead personnel for the JFO Sections (Operations, Planning, Logistics, 
and Administration and Finance) and the ESFs.
• Begin activating and staging Federal teams and other resources in support o f the
n n  l a n f  o r !  Ui/ H U C  rk r  I o  r* r* v A  O  Kl r* O  H p n o r t i r t p n t  A t 4
Execute pre-scripted mission assignments and readiness contracts, as directed by 
DHS.
Some Federal departments or agencies may deploy to an incident under their own 
authorities. In these instances, Federal departments or agencies will notify the appropriate 
entities such as the NOC, JFO, State EOCs, and the local Incident Command. Below the 
diagram shows how the various jurisdictional areas are working under ICS while sending 
the request and receive the assistance.
*Some Federal agencies (U .S . Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency, etc.) 
have statutory responsibility for response and may coordinate and/or integrate 
directly with affected jurisdictions.
Figure 4.1: Flow of Requests and Assistance during Large-Scale Incidents (Source: 
National Incident Management System of USA, December 2008)
4.1.1.12 Emergency Support Function (ESF)
In USA the Federal has got its own Emergency Support Function (ESF) group for 
responding in any disaster where the assistance o f Federal is in need. The ESFs are 
coordinated by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) through its National 
Response Coordination Center (NRCC). During a response, ESFs are a critical 
mechanism to coordinate functional capabilities and resources provided by Federal 
departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector and nongovernmental 
organizations. They represent an effective way to bundle and funnel resources and 
capabilities to local, tribal. State, and other responders. The ESF has elaborated in the 
following list.
Table 4.1: Emergency Support Function (ESF) (Source: National Response Framework o f
USA, January 2008)
Ser No Sector ESF Coordinator
01 Transportation & Infrastructure Department o f Transportation
02 Communication DHS (National Communications 
System)
03 Public Works & Engineering Department o f Defense (U.S. Army 
Corps o f Engineers)
04 Fire Service Department o f  Agriculture (U.S. 
Forest Service)
05 Emergency M anagement DHS (Federal Emergency 
M anagement Agency or FEMA)
06 Mass Care, Housing & Human 
Services
DHS (FEM A)
07 Resource Support General Services Administration and 
DHS (FEM A)
08 Health & Medical Services Department o f Health and Human 
Services
09 Urban Search & Rescue DHS (FEM A)
10 Oil & Hazardous Materials 
Response
Environmental Protection Agency
11 Agriculture, Natural Resources Department o f Agriculture
12 Energy Department o f Energy
13 Public Safety & Security Department o f Justice
14 Recovery & Mitigation DHS( Department o f Homeland 
Security)
15 External Affairs DHS( Department o f Homeland 
Security)
4.1.1.13 Joint Field Office (JFO)
The JFO is the primary Federal incident management field structure. The JFO is a 
temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination o f Federal, 
State, tribal, and local governments and private-sector and nongovernmental 
organizations with primary responsibility for response and recovery. The JFO structure is 
organized, staffed, and managed in a m anner consistent with NIMS principles and is led 
by the Unified Coordination Group. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure, the JFO 
does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to 
on-scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend beyond the 
incident site. Personnel from Federal and State departments and agencies, other 
jurisdictional entities, the private sector, and NGOs may be requested to staff various 
levels o f the JFO, depending on the requirements o f the incident.
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the overall effectiveness o f the Federal incident management. When appointed, such an 
individual serves in the field as the PFO for the incident. A PFO is a senior Federal 
official with proven management experience and strong leadership capabilities. The PFO 
deploys with a small, highly trained mobile support staff. The same individual will not 
serve as the Principal Federal Official and the Federal Coordinating Officer at the same 
time for the same incident. The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command 
structure established at the incident.
4.1.1.15 Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)
The FCO is a senior FEMA official trained, certified, and well experienced in emergency 
management, and specifically appointed to coordinate Federal support in the response to 
and recovery from emergencies and major disasters. In all cases, the FCO represents the 
FEMA Adm inistrator in the field to discharge all FEMA responsibilities for the response 
and recovery efforts underway.
4.1.1.16 Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)
DOD has appointed 10 DCOs and assigned one to each FEMA region. If requested and 
approved, the DCO serves as DOD's single point o f contact at the JFO for requesting 
assistance from DOD. With few exceptions, requests for Defense Support o f Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) originating at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through 
the DCO. The DCO may have a Defense Coordinating Element consisting o f a staff and 
military liaison officers to facilitate coordination and support to activated ESFs. Specific 
responsibilities o f  the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include 
processing requirements for military support, forwarding mission assignments to the 
appropriate military organizations through DOD-designated channels, and assigning 
military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated ESFs.
4.1.1.17 Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander
Based on the complexity and type o f incident, and the anticipated level o f DOD resource 
involvement, DOD may elect to designate a JTF to command Federal military activities in 
support o f the incident objectives. If a JTF is established, consistent with operational 
requirements, its command and control element will be co-located with the senior on­
scene leadership at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity o f  effort. The co-location o f 
the JTF command and control element does not replace the requirement for a 
DCO/Defense Coordinating Element as part o f the JFO Unified Coordination Staff. The
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DCO remains the DOD single point o f contact in the JFO for requesting assistance from 
DOD. The JTF Commander exercises operational control o f Federal military personnel 
and most defense resources in a Federal response. Some DOD entities, such as the U.S. 
Army Corps o f Engineers, may respond under separate established authorities and do not 
provide support under the operational control o f a JTF Commander. Unless federalized, 
National Guard forces remain under the control o f a State Governor. Close coordination 
between Federal military, other DOD entities, and National Guard forces in a response is 
critical. Based on the scope and nature o f an incident, senior officials from other Federal 
departments and agencies, State, tribal, or local governments, and the private sector or 
NGOs may participate in a Unified Coordination Group. Usually, the larger and more 
complex the incident, the greater the number o f entities represented.
4.1.2 ICS in Canada
Disaster response in Canada is the responsibility o f elected officials at municipal level. 
They are mandated by law to prepare for and respond to disasters, which might affect 
their public (EPC, 1992). Within that broad jurisdiction are elements o f various other 
jurisdictions: fire, police, emergency medical services, health officials, dangerous good 
specialists, members o f local industry and public officials from provincial and federal 
government departments. However, the ultimate responsibility for disaster response lies 
with elected officials, not o f the Fire Chief, EMS personnel or Police Chief as many 
assume. The rare exceptions to the rule are disasters with broad geographical impact (i.e., 
those affecting a number o f communities), or those events, which affect areas under 
provincial or federal jurisdiction.
An effective emergency management system must permit a team effort from those used to 
responding to emergencies on the one hand, and integrate the jurisdictional needs o f the 
m unicipality’s elected officials on the other. The system must factor-in the involvement 
o f elected officials, who most likely have little experience with emergency response, and 
must ultimately lay the responsibility for response on their shoulders.
Within Canada three basic systems could be used to manage disasters. These systems 
include the following systems:
• The Incident Command System (ICS),
• British Columbia Emergency Response M anagement System (BCERM S)
• Emergency Site M anagement System (ESM).
These systems have some common elements, and some unique features. These three 
systems being essentially utilized within Canada to manage disasters at community or
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municipal level. Within these systems there are variations reflecting provincial standards, 
organizational culture, and to a lesser degree the preference o f those who employ these 
systems.
The ICS system is well known by most first responders in Canada, particularly those from 
the fire services. Responders at site level who wish to manage emergencies and follow an 
existing chain o f command, frequently use the ICS system. Because o f their prior 
knowledge o f this system and its application ICS often becomes the preferred or default 
system for large scale emergencies. Unfortunately, many municipal officials may not 
have experience with the ICS system or be aware o f the terminology and intricate 
command structure or reporting procedures. Their lack o f understanding combined with 
their overall responsibility for an effective disaster m anagement could lead to confusion, 
awkward shifts o f command and control, and ultimately an uncoordinated response.
The ESM model was designed, to address this concern and clearly indicates the roles and 
responsibilities o f municipal officials. The problem with this system however, is the lack 
o f regular exposure to the process. Many communities and their diverse agencies do not 
regularly plan or train for disasters. Their three key response agencies (i.e., Fire, EMS, 
and Police) plan and regularly train their personnel. They also have regular exposure to 
emergencies and typically use the structure (i.e., ICS), which suits their respective 
professional needs during "normal’ emergencies. When these emergencies expand to 
require more agencies to work together, the three response agencies may be reluctant to 
switch to the ESM model. This reluctance may occur because the ESM system has not 
been properly practiced, or due to an initial commitment at the site to the ICS approach. 
In times o f stress, and most disasters are stressful, people revert to what they know or are 
comfortable with rather than try new methods. Consequently, the ESM system, which 
otherwise would assist in coordination and communication, is left untried. This may be 
particularly confusing and frustrating for municipal officials who are not familiar with 
any o f the existing roles and responsibilities. British Columbia may have developed a 
solution to the problem by customizing the ICS system to incorporate Municipal leaders 
and government officials with the intention o f providing harmony. Although the system 
should provide effective emergency management practices within the province in which 
is was designed, it may cause significant conflicts in cross-border disaster situations when 
other provinces or states respond by using other systems. The BC system also requires 
fairly extensive training by all those who would perform a role in the various levels o f 
activation.
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4.1.3 ICS in Australia
In Australia the disaster management is carried out following the Australian Government 
Disaster Response Plan (COM DISPLAN) through the Australian Inter- Service Incident 
M anagement System (AIIMS) which was developed in Australia during the mid-eighties, 
its genesis being the American National Inter -agency Incident M anagement System. 
Since the introduction o f AIMS the frequency and complexity o f  multi agency operations 
both within and across State borders have increased. AIMS can operate effectively in any 
type o f incident imminent or actual, natural, industrial or civil and the many other 
situations in which emergency management organizations are involved. AIM S achieved 
by providing a common framework for organizations working in emergency management 
roles that assist the more effective and efficient control o f the incident.
Once any disaster took place in a state in that case the State Governments have 
responsibility, within their borders, for coordinating and planning for the response to and 
recovery from disasters and civil emergencies. When the total resources (government, 
community and commercial) o f an affected State cannot reasonably cope with the needs 
o f the situation, the State Government can seek assistance from the Australian 
Government. The Australian Government accepts responsibility and prepares plans for 
providing Australian Government physical assistance in response to such requests. The 
Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COM DISPLAN) provides the 
framework for addressing State requests for Australian Government physical assistance 
arising from any type o f disaster or emergency.
The Attorney-General is designated as the Cabinet M inister with responsibility for 
disaster-related matters. Emergency M anagement Australia (EM A) is nominated as the 
agency responsible for planning and coordinating Australian Government physical 
assistance to the States under the Australian Government Emergency M anagement Policy 
Statement. Coordination o f this assistance is carried out from the Emergency 
M anagement Australia Incident Management Facility (EMA IMF).
COM DISPLAN complements State emergency response arrangements and its 
effectiveness relies heavily on support from a number o f Australian Government 
agencies. So that all agencies can respond in a timely manner, they should develop 
arrangements in support o f COM DISPLAN, and provide EMA with a copy.
In the context o f AIIMS the Australian government followed a different terminology like 
Incident Controller instead o f Incident Commander and kept one safety advisor instead o f 
a safetv officer. The Incident Controller doesn’t have the Liaison officer or Information
Incident controller increases the perimeter o f his working field in three sections basing on 
the disaster scenario like Planning, Operation and Logistics Section but the financial 
section is in corporate with the logistics section. According to ICS the leading agency 
will nominate the incident commander but in AIIMS the control authority will nominate 
the Incident controller. And each state has got own specific incident controller who has 
powered by the Australian government. This incident controller can seek permission for 
help when the disaster scenario will be out o f the control o f that particular state. The 
current States authorities nominated to initiate requests under COM DISPLAN are:
Table 4.2: The current States authorities nominated to initiate requests under 
COM DISPLAN (Source: The Australian Inter -  Service Incident M anagement System, 
_____i______________ Third Edition, Version 1, and 13 April 2004)___________________
Ser
No
Name of the State Incident Controller ( Authorized By Australian 
Government)
01 New South Wales 
State
Emergency Operations Controller
02 Victoria State Emergency Response Coordinator (C hief Commissioner 
o f Police)
03 Queensland Executive Officer State Disaster M anagement Group
04 South Australia State Coordinator
05 Western Australia State Emergency Coordinator, Chairman State Emergency 
M anagement Committee (Com missioner o f  Police)
06 Tasmania Executive Officer, State Emergency M anagement 
Committee and Executive
07 Northern Terri Executive Officer, Northern Territory Counter- Disaster 
Council
08 Australian Capital Territory Chairperson ACT Emergency M anagement 
Committee. (Commissioner Emergency Services Agency)
09 Norfolk Island Chair Norfolk Island Emergency M anagement 
Committee
10 Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands
The Territory Controller, Cocos (Keeling) Islands
11 Christmas Island The Territory Controller, Christmas Island
12 Jervis Bay The Territory Controller, Jervis Bay
4.2 ICS in Developing Countries
In developing countries they are trying to formulate the ICS in their present Government 
context basing on the political perspective and cultural value. Because it is difficult to 
follow the same pattern or structure o f ICS the way it is followed in developed countries. 
The developed countries like Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh are introduced the system 
in their Disaster M anagement process. And India could progress more in this aspect they 
have already formulated the Incident response System (IRS) for integrating all the 
responder agencies in ICS. The developing countries have got more critical compare to 
Developed country. Because in developing countries the Armed Forces maximum time 
play the important role being a supportive role. Again the Armed Forces have got more 
influence over political Government. In 3rd world Countries number o f time intervention 
by the Armed Forces made the relationship difficult between Armed Forces and Civil 
administration. All these factors are made difficult to introduce the ICS in developing 
countries. The ICS in developing countries especially in India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
will be discussed in the following section.
4.2.1 ICS in India
The Government o f India (Gol) in 2003 decided to adopt the Incident Command System 
(ICS) as practiced in USA. The ICS addressed most o f the critical gaps in Indian disaster 
response mechanism even though there were certain Indian specific modifications which 
were necessary to be addressed. There was a need to prepare an Indian version which 
would fit into the Indian Administrative Structure. NDM A therefore took up the 
adaptation o f the ICS which incorporate the existing administrative structure and the 
provisions o f  DM Act, 2005. The principles and features o f ICS have been followed and 
comprehensive Guidelines have been prepared. This adapted version will be referred as 
the Incident Response System and will go by the acronym o f IRS.
4.2.1.1 Definition and Context
The Incident Response System (IRS) is an effective mechanism for reducing the scope for 
ad-hoc measures in response. It incorporates all the tasks that may be performed during 
DM irrespective o f their level o f complexity. It envisages a composite team with various 
Sections to attend to all the possible response requirements. The IRS identifies and 
designates officers to perform various duties and get them trained in their respective roles. 
If IRS is put in place and stakeholders trained and made aware o f their roles, it will 
greatly help in reducing chaos and confusion during the response phase. Every one will
know what needs to be done,
Who will do it and who is in command, etc. IRS is a flexible system and all the Sections, 
Branches and Units need not be activated at the same time. Various Sections, Branches 
and Units need to be activated only as and when they are required.
4.2.1.2 IRS Organization
The IRS organization functions through Incident Response Teams (IRTs) in the field. In 
line with our administrative structure and DM Act 2005, Responsible Officers (ROs) have 
been designated at the State and District level as overall in charge o f the incident response 
management. The RO may however delegate responsibilities to the Incident Commander 
(IC), who in turn will manage the incident through IRTs. The IRTs will be pre-designated 
at all levels; State, District, Sub-Division and Tehsil/Block. On receipt o f Early Warning, 
the RO will activate them. In case a disaster occurs without any warning, the local IRT 
will respond and contact RO for further support, if required. A Nodal Officer (NO) has to 
be designated for proper coordination between the District, State and National level in 
activating air support for response. Apart from the RO and Nodal Officer (NO), the IRS 
has two main components; a) Command Staff and b) General Staff. The structure is 
shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 4.3: Organization o f IRS (Source: National Disaster Management Guidelines 
Incident Response System by National Disaster Management Authority, Government of
India July 2010)
Command Staff
The Command Staff consists o f Incident Commander (IC), Information & Media 
Officer (IMO), Safety Officer (SO) and Liaison Officer (LO). They report directly 
to the IC and may have assistants. The Command Staff may or may not have 
supporting organizations under them. The main function o f the Command Staff is 
to assist the IC in the discharge o f his functions.
General Staff
The General S taff has three components which are as follows;
• Operations Section (OS) The OS is responsible for directing the 
required tactical actions to meet incident objectives. M anagement o f 
disaster may not immediately require activation o f Branch, Division and 
Group. Expansion o f the OS depends on the enormity o f  the situation and 
number o f different types and kinds o f functional Groups required in the 
response management.
• Planning Section (PS) The PS is responsible for collection, 
evaluation and display o f incident information, maintaining and tracking 
resources, preparing the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and other necessary 
incident related documentation. They will assess the requirement o f 
additional resources, propose from where it can be mobilized and keep IC 
informed. This Section also prepares the demobilization plan
• Logistics Section (LS) The LS is responsible for providing 
facilities, services, materials, equipment and other resources in support o f 
the incident response. The Section C hief participates in development and 
implementation o f the IAP, activates and supervises Branches and Units 
o f his section. In order to ensure prompt and smooth procurement and 
supply o f resources as per financial rules.
4.2.1.3 Features o f  IRS
Management by Objectives M anagement by Objectives (MBO) covers four essential 
steps in IRS. These steps should be taken for the m anagement o f every incident regardless 
o f its size or complexity:
• Understand Government policy and directions including relief code, 
evacuation procedures etc.;
Establishment o f incident objectives;
• Selection o f appropriate strategies; and
• Performance o f tactical moves (assigning the right resources, and 
m onitoring performance, etc.).
Unity o f Command and Chain o f Command In IRS, Unity o f Command means 
that every individual has a designated supervisor. Chain o f Command means that there 
is an orderly line o f authority within the ranks o f the organization with a clear cut 
reporting pattern right from the lowest level to the highest. In the IRS, the Chain o f 
Command is established through a prescribed organizational structure which consists 
o f various layers such as Sections, Branches, Divisions, etc. This feature eliminates the 
possibility o f  receiving conflicting orders from various supervisors. Thus it increases 
accountability, prevents freelancing, improves the flow o f  information, and helps in 
smooth coordination in operational efforts.
Transfer o f Command
The command o f an incident initially is vested in the highest ranking authority in the 
area where the disaster occurs. The Transfer o f Command in any incident may take 
place for the following reasons:
When an incident becomes overwhelming for the IC and IRT;
• More qualified and experienced senior officers arrive at the scene;
• The incident situation changes over time, where a jurisdictional or agency 
change in command is operationally required; and
• Normal turnover o f personnel in the case o f long or extended incidents.
The various processes in IRS o f briefing, debriefing, documentation through forms and 
formats, prove very useful during transfer o f command. The IAP, assignment list, details 
o f actions already taken, resources deployed, available, ordered etc. gives an immediate 
and comprehensive view o f the incident status to the new comer.
Organizational Flexibility The IRS organization is a need based flexible 
organization. All the components need not be activated simultaneously. It would depend 
upon the nature and requirements o f the incident. Each activated Section, Branch or Unit 
must have a person in charge to perform its role. In some cases, because o f lack o f 
personnel, a single supervisor may be made in-charge o f more than one Group, Unit or 
Section. It should be clearly understood that in such cases the Groups, Units, Sections do 
not get merged / amalgamated. Their functioning would continue to be independent. Only 
the supervisory work / responsibility will be performed and discharged by the same
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individual. The organizational elements that are no longer required should be deactivated 
to reduce the size o f the organization and to ensure appropriate use o f resources.
Span o f Control Span o f control refers to the number o f elements (Section, Branch 
or Unit) that one supervisor can directly manage effectively. Ideally a supervisor should 
have five organizational elements under his control. However if  the elements increase to 
more than five or are reduced to less than three, necessary changes in the IRS 
organizational structure should be carried out.
Area Command Area Command is an expansion o f the Incident Response 
function, primarily designed to manage a very large number o f incidents that has multiple 
IRTs assigned or area being isolated because o f geographical reasons. It is established for 
overseeing response and to ensure that conflicts, jurisdictional or otherwise, do not arise 
amongst deployed responding teams.
Unified Command (UC UC is a team effort that allows all agencies with 
jurisdictional responsibility for the incident, either geographical or functional, to manage 
an incident by establishing a common set o f incident objectives and strategies under one 
commander. This is accomplished through the UC fram ework headed by Governor / Lt. 
Governor (LG) / Adm inistrator / Chief M inister (CM) and assisted by C hief Secretary 
(CS) without losing or abdicating agency authority, responsibility or accountability. 
Integrated Communications Ability to communicate within the IRS structure is very 
important. Provision for a complete Communication Unit has been made in the LS. 
Several communication networks may be established depending upon the size, 
complexity o f the incident, availability o f various types o f equipment and the 
simultaneous need to communicate by a number o f responders and agencies. These may 
include Command Net, Operational Net, Logistics Net and Ground to Air Net. A suitable 
interoperable and compatible network between various agencies will have to be designed. 
This networking is also vital for the integration o f agency capabilities like the NDRF, 
Armed Forces, etc. when they come in aid and support. The Gol is also concurrently 
working on a National Disaster Communication Network (NDCN) which will be useful in 
extreme disasters when all existing communication systems have failed.
4.2.1.4 The Incident Response Teams (IRTs) at State and District Levels 
The IRT is a team comprising o f all positions o f IRS organization as shown in Fig. 3 
headed by IC. The OS helps to prepare different tactical operations as required. The PS 
helps in obtaining different in formations and preparing plans as required. The LS
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assesses the availability and requirement o f resources and takes action for obtaining them. 
IRTs will function at State, District, Sub-Division and the Tehsil / Block levels.
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Figure 4.4: IRT Framework (Source: National Disaster Management Guidelines Incident 
Response System by National Disaster Management Authority, Government o f India July
2010)
These teams will respond to all natural and man-made disasters. The lowest 
administrative unit (Sub-Division, Tehsil or Block) will be the first responder as the case 
may be. If the incident becomes complex and is beyond the control o f local IRT, the 
higher level IRT will be informed and they will take over the response management. In 
such cases the lower level IRT will merge with higher level IRT. When a lower level of 
IRT (e.g. Block / Tehsil) merges with a higher level (e.g. Sub-Division, District or State)
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the role o f IC o f  lower level o f IRT will change. When the Block level IRT merges with 
Sub-Division level IRT, IC o f the Block level may play the role o f Deputy IC or OSC or 
any other duty that the IC o f higher authority assigns. This process will be applicable at 
all levels.
To sum up, IRS is a system o f M anagement by Objectives through Incident Action Plan 
(IAP). It takes care o f any expanding incident through an organizational structure o f 
Command Staff, Sections, Branches, Divisions, Groups, Units, resources and span o f 
control. Through Unified Command (UC) it allows all agencies having jurisdictional or 
functional responsibilities to jointly develop incident objectives and strategies. It has a 
clear cut process for personnel accountability, resource management, integrated 
communications and transfer o f command. In line with the federal structure o f the 
country, it should be clearly understood that response to any disaster will be carried out 
by the concerned States and Districts. The Gol will play a supporting role by way o f 
assistance in the form o f resources, manpower (NDRF, Armed & Para Military Forces), 
equipment and funds. At the Gol level, the NCMC or NEC will coordinate and provide 
the required resources. NDMA will also help in monitoring the coordination o f response.
4.2.1.5 Response Mechanism
India has a well defined, robust and time tested administrative structure. Section 22(2), 
24, 30 and 34 o f  DM Act 2005 has clearly laid down various duties relating to DM to be 
performed by various agencies. No single agency or department can handle a disaster 
situation o f any scale alone. Different departments have to work together to manage the 
disaster. For proper coordination and effective use o f all available resources, the different 
departments and agencies need a formalized response m anagement structure that lends 
consistency, fosters efficiency and provides appropriate direction during response. 
Response M anagement constitutes the functions o f planning, execution and coordination. 
While planning in the pre-disaster phase is the responsibility o f various authorities created 
under the DM Act, the execution o f the plans has to be carried out by the various line 
departments o f the Government and the existing administrative structure in the District 
and State. For coordination and ensuring smooth execution o f the plans, bodies like 
NDMA, NEC, SDMA and SEC have been created at the National and State Level. At the 
District level, planning, execution and coordination o f all the activities have been vested 
in the DDMA itself.
The IRTs will be pre-designated at all levels. On receipt o f early warning the RO may 
activate them. In case o f occurrence o f disaster without any warning, the local IRTs will 
respond and report to RO and request further support, if  required. In view o f the 
provisions o f the DM Act 2005 and the administrative structure existing in the country at 
the District and State levels, the roles o f the Chief Secretary (CS) and the District 
Magistrates / DC is all encompassing as regards response. In the IRS, a need was felt to 
clearly identify a designated authority responsible and accountable by law to respond to 
disasters and therefore a position o f Responsible Officer (RO) has been introduced. 
Incident response management may however not always require the direct intervention o f 
the RO. On the ground, the management will be done by the IC to whom powers will 
have to be delegated by the RO. The CSs and the District M agistrates/DCs will perform 
the role o f ROs in their respective administrative jurisdictions and will be overall 
responsible for all response activities during any incident or crisis. The roles o f CSs and 
District M agistrates / DCs have been distinguished in this chapter, so that there will be no 
ambiguity in the implementation o f the IRS for incident response. As per the DM Act, it 
will be seen that the CS is the C hief Executive Officer (CEO) o f the SDMA as well as 
Chairperson o f the SEC. Hel is also the head o f the administrative structure in the State. 
The District M agistrate / DC is the Chairperson o f the DDMA and has been assigned all 
encompassing role o f planning, coordination and execution o f DM in his2 jurisdiction 
assisted by all line departments and local bodies. Though at the District level the 
Chairperson o f the Zila Parishad has also been placed as the Co-Chairperson o f the 
DDMA to elicit the community participation in DM, yet the responsibility for disaster 
response clearly lies with the District M agistrate/DC being the head o f the District 
administration. It will only be the administrative machinery -  CS, District Magistrate / 
DC and their team o f officers who will be responsible and accountable for effective 
response in their jurisdictions. To elicit or mobilize the NGOs, PRIs and communities and 
other stakeholders for support at the District level, the Co-Chairperson o f  the DDMA may 
prove helpful.
4.2.1.6 Lead Agency /  Nodal Department
The National Policy on DM 2009, has stated that emergencies requiring the close 
involvement o f the security forces and/or intelligence agencies such as terrorism (counter­
insurgency), and order situations, serial bomb blasts, hijacking, air accidents, CBRN, 
mine disasters, port and harbor emergencies, forest fires, oilfield fires and oil spills will 
continue to be handled by the extant mechanism i.e. NCMC and the resources available
with the DM Authorities at all levels with regard to cross cutting themes like medical, 
rescue & relief etc. will be made available to the Nodal ministries/agencies at times o f 
such disasters / impending disasters. Apart from the above, the management o f other 
major natural and manmade disasters will also require Lead and supporting agencies. 
Different disasters require different types o f expertise for response. Thus, in case o f 
rescue and relief in natural disaster, it will generally be the local Police and the NDRF / 
SDRF, in case o f Fire it will be the Fire department, in case o f drought it will be the 
Agriculture department, in case o f Epidemics and other Biological disasters it will be the 
Health department that will have to play the lead role and the remaining departments will 
have to play the supporting role as per requirement and their core competencies. The 
Chief Coordinator at the national level and the ROs at the State and District level will 
ensure sensitization o f the concerned departments in advance regarding their roles as lead 
and supporting agencies.
4.2.1.7 Coordination o f Response at the District Level
The District M agistrate/DC is the head o f the District administrative set up and 
chairperson o f the DDMA as per the DM Act, 2005. He has been designated as the RO in 
the District. The heads o f different departments in the District will have separate roles to 
play depending on the nature and kind o f disaster. The roles and responsibilities o f the 
members o f the DDMA will be decided in advance in consultation with the concerned 
members. The roles o f other line departments also have to be clearly delineated in various 
disaster situations in the District DM Plan which will be duly approved by the State 
Government, so that there will be no ambiguity about their functions during response. 
The District M agistrate / DC / RO will issue a Standing Order for formation o f IRT at 
District headquarters / Sub-Division and Tehsil / Block levels. He will ensure that 
appropriate and experienced officers are selected for IRTs. The selection o f the OSC will 
however depend on the nature o f the disaster.
In case o f flood and earthquakes reaching the affected area, rescuing the affected people 
and providing relief to them is the main task o f the responders. People have to leave their 
home in a hurry and they are not able to take away their valuables. These abandoned 
houses become vulnerable. The relief materials while being transported also become 
prone to loot. In such cases, Police and the Armed Forces are the best suited to handle and 
lead the operations. In case o f fire at District level, it will be the District Fire Officer who 
will be appropriate officer to handle the situation. In case o f health related disaster, it 
would be the District Chief Medical Officer and so on. There could even be such
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situations when the District officials may have no expertise in operational sing the 
response like CBRN disasters. For such disaster situations the OSC should be identified 
in advance, so that he could be easily mobilized to lead the OS as Section Chief. NDMA 
has already issued detailed guidelines on management o f such response vide National 
Disaster Management Guidelines on the management o f Nuclear and Radiological 
emergencies which should be followed. Other Section Chiefs will be selected according 
to the suitability and capability o f the officer. In case o f Sub-Division, Tehsil or Block, 
the respective heads, i.e. SDO, Tehsildar, and BDO will function as the 1C in their 
respective IRTs and the OSC will be selected as per nature o f the disaster.
During the pre-disaster period, the RO will ensure capacity building o f all IRT members 
in their respective roles and responsibilities as discussed in the subsequent chapters. The 
complete IRS organizational structure at District level is depicted in Fig. 5. The structure 
depicted above may be activated as and when required. For monitoring and support o f the 
incident response, the RO will involve all required ESF and headquarter IRT to support 
the on scene IC. In case when central teams (NDRF, Armed Forces) are deployed, the RO 
will ensure resolution o f all conflicts. For this purpose he may attach a representative o f 
such agencies in the EOC where all conflicts can easily be resolved at the highest level. 
The teams so deployed will have to work in OS in the form o f Single Resource, Strike 
Teams or Task Forces under the supervision of OSC. The IC will also exercise close 
supervision for resolution o f all conflicts, if required. The IC will work in close 
coordination with EOC and report to RO. The RO will ensure that the strategic goals are 
achieved through the implementation o f the IAP by the IRTs working in the field.
Figure 4.5: IRTs at District Level (Source: (Source: National Disaster Management 
Guidelines Incident Response System by National Disaster Management Authority,
Government o f India July 2010)
4.2.1.8 Roles and Responsibilities o f District Magistrate as RO 
The District M agistrate / RO will ensure his following responsibilities:
Ensure that IRTs are formed at District, Sub-Division, Tehsil/Block levels and 
IRS is integrated in the District DM Plan as per Section 31 o f the DM Act, 2005. 
This may be achieved by issuing a Standing Order by the RO to all SDOs, SDMs 
and Tehsildars/ BDOs;
• Ensure web based / on line Decision Support System (DSS) is in place in EOC 
and connected with Sub-Division and Tehsil / Block level IRTs for support;
• Ensure that toll free emergency numbers existing for Police, Fire and Medical 
support etc. are linked to the EOC for response, command and control. For e.g., if 
there is any fire incident, the information should not only reach the fire station but 
also the EOC and the nearest hospital to gear up the emergency medical service; 
Obtain funds from State Government as recommended by the 13th FC (Annexure
-  XVI) and ensure that a training calendar for IRTs o f District is prepared and 
members o f IRTs are trained through ATIs and other training institutions o f the 
District;
• delegate authorities to the IC;
• Activate IRTs at District headquarter, Sub-Division, Tehsil / Block levels, as and 
when required;
• Appoint / deploy, terminate and demobilize IC and IRT(s) as and when required;
• Decide overall incident objectives, priorities and ensure that various objectives do 
not conflict with each other;
• Ensure that IAP is prepared by the IC and implemented;
• remain fully briefed on the IAP and its implementation ;
• Coordinate all response activities;
• Give directions for the release and use o f  resources available with any department 
o f the Government, Local Authority, private sector etc. in the District;
• Ensure that local Armed Forces Commanders are involved in the planning process 
and their resources are appropriately dovetailed, if required;
• ensure that when Armed Forces arrive in support for disaster response, their 
logistic requirements like camping grounds, potable water, electricity and 
requirement o f vehicles etc. are sorted out;
• Appoint a NO at the District level to organize Air Operations in coordination with 
the State and Central Government NO. Also ensure that all ICs o f IRTs o f the 
District are aware o f it;
• Ensure that the NGOs carry out their activities in an equitable and non- 
discriminatory manner;
• Deploy the District Headquarter IRTs at the incident site, in case o f need;
• Ensure that effective communications are in place;
• Ensure that telephone directory o f all ESF is prepared and available with EOC 
and members o f IRTs;
• Ensure provision for accountability o f personnel and a safe operating 
environment;
• In case the situation deteriorates, the RO may assume the role o f the IC and may 
seek support from the State level RO;
• Mobilize experts and consultants in the relevant fields to advise and assist as he 
may deem necessary;
Procure exclusive or preferential use o f amenities from any authority or person;
• Conduct post response review on performance o f IRTs and take appropriate steps 
to improve performance; and
• Take other necessary action as the situation demands.
4.2.1.9 Role o f  Special Force instead o f Regular force
The Indian Government has made decision to establish NDRF and SDRF for minimizing 
the dependency to the Armed Forces as well as avoid the conflict regarding command 
control authority between civil and military administration. It will also facilitate the 
Armed Forces to engage their own primary task. The NDRF is a national resource it’s a 
force which is highly trained on Disaster M anagement and emergency response operation. 
At present Indian government established 8 battalions, 02 each from the Border Security 
Force (BSF), Central Police Reserve Force (CRPF) and Indo- Tibetan Border Police 
(ITBP). All the Battalion are equipped and trained to combat for all natural disaster 
including four battalions in combating nuclear, biological and chemical disasters.
4.2.1.10 State Disaster Response Force (SDRF)
GOI has taken an effort to create response capabilities from within the state existing 
resources. To start with, each State may aim at equipping and training a few companies in 
smaller states or one battalion equivalent force in the case o f bigger states. They will also 
include women members for looking after the needs o f women and children. National 
Disaster Response Force (NDRF) battalions and their training institutions will assist the 
States/UTs in this effort. The States/UTs will also be encouraged to include DM training
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in the basic and in-service courses o f their respective Police Training Colleges for gazette 
and non-gazette police officers. In India the Bihar will be the first state to have its own 
State Disaster Response Force (SDRF). This SDRF will be manned by 1,157 persons, 
drawn particularly from Army and Navy. They will be enrolled in SDRF as a contractual 
basis. Initially the SDRF will have six companies; each will have three platoons which 
would be called teams.
4.2.2 ICS in Sri Lanka
In July 2005, the Sri Lanka Disaster M anagement Act No. 13 o f 2005 was enacted which 
provides the legal basis for instituting a disaster risk m anagement system in the country. 
The National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) is a high-level inter-ministerial 
body. The chairman and vice chairman o f the NCDM is H.E. the President and 
Honourable Prime M inister respectively. Other members are Leader o f the Opposition, 
Ministers in charge o f 20 selected subject areas, Provincial Council C hief M inisters and 
five members o f the Opposition. The Act also provides for establishing the Disaster 
M anagement Centre (DMC) under the Council to be the apex body for the purpose o f 
planning, co-coordinating and implementing o f certain natural and other forms o f 
disasters in Sri Lanaka.
In Sri Lanka the incident command system (ICS) concept is still on paper. They yet to 
incorporate this system in their disaster management plan. But the M inistry o f Disaster 
management and Human Rights they are arranging number o f workshop for developing 
an action framework basing on their governmental structure. On 24-28 April 2006 there 
was a workshop held at Earl’s Regency Hotel, Kandy, Sri Lanka. This workshop was 
implemented by the United States Department o f Agriculture, Forest Service (USFS). The 
program is supported by The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). The Disaster M anagement Centre (DMC), Ministry o f Disaster M anagement 
and Human Rights, Sri Lanka is the facilitating institution implementing the program. In 
this workshop the government officials from different m inistries were present. This 
workshop facilitated them for developing a structure o f Incident Command System (ICS) 
for Sri Lankan perspective without disturbing the present Government structure.
4.2.2.1 Incident Command System Adaptation
To understand whether all the functional areas o f ICS were applicable in Sri Lanka the 
groups were asked to answer 3 questions: 1 what functional areas are appropriate for Sri
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Lanka? 2. What functional areas are not appropriate for Sri Lanka? 3. What adaptation 
can be made to better meet the needs o f Sri Lanka?
4.2.2.2 Logistics Section
All the functional area under the logistics section is applicable to Sri Lanka but there 
needs to be some adaptations based on country context. Service Branch Director, Support 
Branch Director could be amalgamated. Sub units in functional areas could be reduced, 
but need a dedicated study before implement.
The logistics section need to divide into six main areas: communication, medical, food, 
supply, facilities and ground support. Figure shows the recommended organizational chart 
for the logistics section.
Figure 4.6: Logistics section organizational chart (Source: Incident Command System 
for Disaster Management, U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS)
Program, April 2006)
4.2.2.3 Planning Section
Planning section needs to design base on the ground reality o f Sri Lanka. Group proposed 
to divide planning section into four units: resources, situation, demobilization and 
documentation. The situation unit needs to combine with political activities at the grass 
root level, NGOs/ CBOs, Gramma Niladharis, Samurdhi Official and Religious Leaders. 
Figure below shows the units under planning section:
Figure 4.7: Units under Planning Section (Source: Incident Command System for Disaster 
Management, U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) Program, April
2006)
Three planners could be engaged under planning from three different organizations. 
Group suggested Disaster Management Center or DMC/DMU can be IC, Relief and 
rehabilitation can be NDMC and Divisional and District Secretary o f GA will work on 
administration. If there is single divisional incident secretary o f the division can manage 
the incident, but if multiple divisions involved need to handle by the additional district 
secretary. Political factors need to be considered at every level as there are some striving 
forces working in the country and those factors can not be eliminate (neither giving them 
total control). Thus need to involve them in the consultation process for better planning 
and management.
Figure 4.8: Personnel in the planning section (Source: Incident Command System for 
Disaster Management, U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) Program,
April 2006)
4.2.2.4 Operations Section
All parts o f functional area under operations section are applicable to Sri Lanka. There 
needs to be some revision in the staging area components. A manager needs to be 
appointed in the staging area and he/she must be from Sri Lankan Forces. Staging area 
needs to be more disciplined than others and lots o f materials need to be handled 
efficiently. The staging area needs to divide in three sub manager areas (i.e. personnel, 
equipment and medical/welfare). Figure shows the organizational chart for operation area.
Figure 4.9: Operational organization chart (Source: Incident Command System for 
Disaster Management, U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) Program,
April 2006)
To better meet the needs o f ICS in Sri Lanka basic awareness for public and their 
representative (e.g. civil society) are required. There is a need to develop a mechanism to
provide well trained (ICS), pre-selected and specialized people at different levels with 
identifying types (e.g. I, II, III). Disaster Management Council (DMC) should play 
important role as the focal point to maintain a database for trained ICS persons to use 
them efficiently in any incident.
4.2.2.5 IC and Command Staff 's Section
In the context o f Sri Lanka only the government agents District Secretary (e.g. DS) can 
lead the kind o f situations presented as they are the responsible official. But government 
representative can’t handle all situations every time efficiently. Incident Commander 
should be one who has proper training and management capacity. But the government has 
an administrative structure and it’s not possible to change that structure. Thus Incident 
commander can work directly under the district secretary or the responsible official o f the 
government’s current structure. In the context o f safety measures, it’s not a major concern 
in the Sri Lankan context. Thus safety factors need to be considering in ICS.
Figure 4.10: IC and Command Staffs (Source: Incident Command System for Disaster 
Management, U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) Program, April
2006)
4.2.2.6 Finance/ Administration Section
All functional areas are applicable and are being practiced through the current 
administrative systems in Sri Lanka. However using the ICS model as a guide it can be 
further improved for more efficient and effectives. There needs to be some adaptation in 
the procurement procedures part o f the ICS as Sri Lanka has very limited resources, 
capabilities and capacities.
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4.3 Incident Command system and Military Chain of Command in Bangladesh 
perspective
Military forces will always remain under the operational and administrative control o f the 
military chain o f command, and these forces are subject to redirection or recall at any 
time. The ICS “unified comm and” concept is distinct from the military chain o f command 
use o f this term. And, as such, military forces do not operate under the command o f the 
Incident Commander or under the unified command structure. And in case o f disaster 
response the military administration or Armed forces will always play a supportive role 
rather than a leading. But they have to work with the civil administration that will follow 
the ICS/UC and there might be a situation come when the Armed forces has to play a 
leading role. In such case basing the deployment mode the action framework for military 
administration may vary. Another reason is that country like developed countries where 
the governmental agencies like civil defense or the Fire department are well equipped and 
trained to handle any shorts o f disaster. And disaster like Katrina in USA may occur once 
in a decade where the US Armed forces had to deploy.
In case o f Bangladesh the intensity and frequency o f disaster are more. And maximum 
case these disaster are the beyond the capability o f civil administration. Armed forces or 
military administration has to deploy and play a key role or main responder in most o f the 
time. As a result the Armed forces need to work with other governmental agencies where 
the Armed forces took the key position in planning and execution, providing maximum 
equipment, carried out rescue, evacuation and massive engineering works as well. In such 
a case to drive the whole emergency response operation in same chain o f system with the 
other agencies the Armed forces need to follow the ICS pattern in its chain o f command 
too. The following section depicts some deployment model o f Armed forces.
4.4 Deployment Models of Armed Forces in different scenario
The manner in which military forces are deployed in a humanitarian role can affect 
overall success and performance. Several distinct models can be identified.
• Detached deployment o f military assets: This is the most 
common model - - the military establishment simply donates commodities or 
lends equipment and the necessary personnel to man them. Civilian control over 
deployment is inherent in this model and the most successful applications o f 
military assets usually follow.
• Use o f military units to augment civil manpower (In Aid o f Civil 
Power): Use o f military units to provide additional manpower usually
occurs during or immediately after a disaster. Popular roles are flood and fire 
fighting, debris clearance, post-disaster security and control. The guiding 
principle here is that military personnel should be used only to provide 
extraordinary services during the emergency and/or to supplement civil work if 
there is a manpower shortage. The military should never be used to do work that 
large numbers o f disaster victims could be paid to do. Survivors, especially low- 
income families, need alternative work opportunities and large-scale public works 
programs are a major source o f post-disaster employment.
• Use o f military units as a substitute for civilian workers: In 
crises, it is often proposed that the military take over certain functions from civil 
authorities, ranging from operating municipal water systems to deliver drinking 
water. As a general rule, this is an unsuitable role for the military. Few officers 
have the proper training and military take-over may only delay a return to 
normalcy.
• Use o f  the military in security and police roles: Perhaps the 
most common role for national military units in civil emergencies is as an 
extension o f local police forces. With proper training and subordination to civilian 
authority, this is an effective role for national units. The keys are training and 
subordination. Undisciplined and overly-threatening forces can inadvertently 
create their own sets o f problems. Foreign forces should never be used to augment 
local forces in this role; the local population will see this as a provocation.
• Substitute for Civil administration: The Armed forces are deployed as 
a substitute for the whole civil administration during catastrophe like earthquake 
or Cyclone when the whole civil administrations are collapsed. That is a national 
level disaster in such case the Armed forces play the leading role until the civil 
administration takes over the responsibility. In that case the area are announced 
by the President o f the country as a disaster affected area and Armed Forces are 
task for the limited period o f time to bring the law and order situation in normal 
and help the civil administration for control over the area.
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CHAPTER 5 
ICS IN BANGLADESH: 
FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS
5.1 Tools and Method
ICS is now become the most important tool for managing any type o f disaster in the 
world. ICS is a standardized management tool for meeting the demands of small or large 
emergency or non- emergency situation. This ICS is recently introduced in our revised 
Standing Orders on Disaster 2010. The ICS can play a pivot role in our country as 
emergency response tool. But like other developing countries we also have some 
limitation or need adjustment to introduce the ICS in our country. Sri Lanka or India has 
already progressed more in this aspect and they are trying to incorporate the system 
without disturbing their existing Government structure. This research is mainly carried 
out to propose an action framework for Bangladesh Armed Forces to work under ICS at 
district level. Still in our country the concept is very new and we couldn’t develop any 
working structure for Civil and Military administration to work under ICS jointly.
Further there are number of ideas and logic regarding the following factors like:
■ The Command and Control authority
■ The Delegation of Authority
■ The terminology command, control and coordination
■ The role of Armed Forces in various disasters like flood, landslide, fire 
breakout or the earthquake
The research method is carried out based on interview as the subject is very new in 
Bangladesh and still we don’t have any research paper on the same subject. The 
interviewers are selected from different sector and based on working experience on 
emergency response activities in Bangladesh. The initial planning was made to collect 18 
interviews from different sector but time constraint made it 10. There was a set of 
questions prepared beforehand and basing on the question paper the interview was taken.
5.2 Findings from Expert Interviewees
The interviews were taken based on some selected topics which are important factors for 
preparing the proposed structure of ICS at district level. The interviewees were asked the 
question on those topics and asked to give their comments or suggestions basing on their 
own working experience and knowledge. All the interviews are on individual basis and 
try to find out the crux ideas or suggestions basing on particular subject from each
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interview.
5.2.1 Command and Control authority
The command and control authority is an important factor in our country because of 
various reasons. Basing on this issue there are different thoughts coming from different 
professional background. These are:
• Majority portion of the interviewer has mentioned that the Armed Forces 
shouldn’t handover the command and control authority over the Civil 
Administration at district level. Rather they should work as supportive role or 
some of the cases they may work under the civil administration.
• Some of the interviewer expressed their mind that some of the rare cases like 
Earthquake or any serious catastrophic situation when the entire Civil 
Administration are collapsed, the Armed Forces can control over the entire 
situation and continue until the Civil Administration could regain control over the 
area. But that has to be supported by constitutional order given by the President 
and for limited time being.
Some of the interviewees mentioned that the command, control and coordination 
terminology should be understood clearly by all levels. And especially the 
command and control authority most of the time creates ambiguity among Civil 
Administration and Armed Forces. It will be better to establish a parallel or 
balanced command control authority in between Civil Administration and Anned 
Forces at district level during emergency response.
In our country aspect it has been found that at district level the Armed Forces are 
well experienced than the DC, so it will be better that the well experienced and 
professional person from Armed Forces can act as Incident Commander at district 
level.
Some of the interviewer mentioned that the DC is well oriented with his area of 
Jurisdiction than that of the Commander from Armed Forces. He also knows all 
the governmental and Non Governmental agencies which are working in his area, 
so it will be better to give the responsibility for coordination to DC. The planning 
of rescue, evacuation and relief distribution can be done by the Armed Forces 
commander at district level.
As an incident commander the Armed Forces commander should work parallel to 
DC and before taking any decision he should discuss with the DC and maintain a 
well coordination all the time. The Armed Forces should carry out ICS training at
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unit commander (Lieutenant Colonel) level, so that they act as an incident 
commander at district level.
The defense minister (Prime Minister) should delegate the command and control 
(C2) authority to Principal Staff Officer (PSO) of AFD who is a lieutenant 
General rank. The PSO, AFD should nominate the ICS trained officer at District 
level who will act as an Incident Commander (IC). And the nomination should be 
done before the disaster takes place. The nomination should be done basing on the 
following criteria:
a) Training on ICS
b) Previous experience on disaster management
The dependency on Armed forces should be gradually decreased and at the same 
time the capacity and efficiency of the Civil administration should be enhanced 
for managing any kind of Disaster. In disaster management entire process or the 
ICS the integration of civil administration should be incorporated in such a way 
so that the efficiency of the Government and other related agencies can be 
gradually upgraded.
A local chairman is more oriented than a TNO or an Armed Forces commander in 
an upazilla level. And this is applicable in all levels. In district level the area of 
jurisdiction is very large. So the upazilla is an ideal unit to establish any ideal 
model. To activate a proper ICS system at upazilla level still the area is large 
where number o f agencies will be activated. So a unified command (UC) group 
should be established at Upazilla level. At upazilla the UC should be formed up 
by three men. They are as follows:
The Local government high officials ( TNO at Upazilla level)
The Local Armed Forces Commander ( Nominated by Armed 
Forces Division)
The Local elected political body ( The upazilla Chairman)
If in upazilla level the elected political body integrated in decision making process 
he can organize his party people as well as the local people for any humanitarian 
activities and the governmental high official can supervise the legal aspects. And 
the overall operation, rescue and relief distribution activities can be coordinated by 
the local Armed Forces Commander.
According to above statement in case of District level the UC group can be 
formed as follows:
-  The Deputy Commissioner
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-  The Local Armed Forces Commander (Nominated by Armed 
Forces Division at district level)
-  The Local elected political body at district level (At district level 
in our country we don’t have any define political elected body. So 
in that case there might be one option that the political party can 
nominate the responsible elected political leader for particular 
district)
The integration of political leader has great impact on disaster management 
process especially it will have an important role on ICS. During emergency 
response the political leader are the main driving forces that can organize the local 
affected people and gave them consolation and inspire for fight against the 
disaster. The local political leader can play an important role to manage the local 
volunteer in case of any emergency response operation within a short notice.
• At district level the Armed Force Commander can act as an operational 
commander and DC can act as a coordinator for providing all available resources 
to Armed Force representative for performing his smooth operational activities in 
his district.
• Some of the interviewer mentioned that at district level when the civil 
administration is failed or unable to handle the disaster scenario they asked the 
support from Armed Forces. So it indicates or creates scope for the Armed Forces 
Commander for acting as an incident commander at district level but on the other 
hand the DC is the highest body from the Government sector as well as the 
chairman of the District Disaster Management Committee. So to minimize this 
conflict or the confusion regarding command control authority the DC can 
delegate the authority to Armed Force Commander for the period of emergency 
response phase or a limited period of time.
Some of the interviewer mentioned that at district level the Armed Force 
Commander should not take the charge of Incident Commander rather it should 
be manned by Deputy Commissioner. He gave an example that in 2007 there was 
a landslide occurs at LEBU BAGHAN near Chittagong Cantonment the Army 
was rushed to the spot and took the control over the incident. And unofficially 
they started to act as a leading agency. But according to Disaster Management act 
the City Corporation should handle the scene as a leading agency. But they failed 
to ensure it as well as the Army also didn’t follow the process. So this is a clear 
violation of normal rules which was imposed by the Government. He also
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mentioned that when the civil administration will completely failed to handle the 
scene and asked help from the Armed Forces only then they can act as an Incident 
Commander on behalf of the DC and for the prescribed time only.
5.2.2 Civil- Military Relationship (CMR)
The Civil-Military relationship is a very important factor for determining the ICS 
structure at district level in Bangladesh Perspective. Because in ICS this two components 
has to work very closely so basing on that issue the interviewer were asked suggestions 
and they provide the following ideas :
• The relation between Armed Forces and civil administration is healthy and 
comfortable and it proved during AYLA and SIDR disaster. In our country 
irrespective of military dictatorship or intervene in politics by Armed Forces, the 
people have good faith and confidence on Armed Forces in case of natural 
disaster.
Number of intervention from military dictatorship in our country made the CMR 
somehow complicated and it can clearly understand when the question come who 
will take the control over the scene. Example of the landslide at LEBUBAGHAN, 
when the Army took the control over the situation and later on when the City 
Corporation came to the scene but out of fear they didn’t take the control over the 
scene from the Armed Forces Commander.
• Some of the interviewees mentioned that the civil and military administration can 
work together basing on good faith and confidence. They also mentioned that still 
in our country we don’t have any define and well coordinated effort for the 
development of the CMR
Some of the interviewees mentioned that for successful implementation of ICS 
during emergency response we need a healthy comfortable relationship between 
Armed Forces and Civil Administration. They feel to incorporate distinct policy 
in this aspect.
5.2.3 The Skill and efficiency of the Armed Forces
The interviewees were asked the suggestions or comments regarding the skill and 
management proficiency of the Armed Forces in case of emergency response. Majority 
has shown the positive attitude and agreed that in Bangladesh still Armed Forces has 
enjoyed the superiority in this regard. The suggestions from the interviewees are shown as 
follows:
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The presence of Armed Forces ensures the accountability and reduces the rate of 
corruption. It indicates that people may have some fear on Armed Forces, in some 
case it may positive or negative as well.
The operation plan for rescue or evacuation or the relief distribution plan are 
made by the Armed Forces and maximum times these plan are approved by the 
civil administration without any interfere.
The people of our country have got the confidence more in Armed Forces than 
any other agencies or NGO. People think that when Armed Forces took the 
control over the situation the possibility of corruption decreases. And Armed 
Forces have got more mobility, Good communication, well coordinated approach 
and it’s a disciplined force. Because of these contribution people feel more 
confidence on Armed Forces
The high mobility, distinct chain of command and accountability increases the 
performance of the Armed Forces, but they have lack of technical knowledge and 
the local database which is very essential for caring out any assessment. And 
NGOs can play a better role in that aspect.
Armed Forces can successfully coordinate all operation like rescue, evacuation 
and relief. In Bangladesh the Armed Forces has got the confidence from the 
general mass and they believed that only the Armed Forces can distribute the 
relief material without any interference from political party or corruption. 
Depending on the high mobility, distinct chain of command and accountability 
increases the performance of the Armed Forces. Still this organization can take 
lead in any disaster in Bangladesh.
Armed Forces enjoyed less political interference than any other organization in 
Bangladesh. And thereby the Armed Forces can ensure the relief distribution plan 
in time.
The high mobility, distinct chain of command and accountability increases the 
performance of the Armed Forces, but they have lack of technical knowledge and 
the local database which is very essential for caring out any assessment. And 
NGOs can play a better role in that aspect. He also mentioned that the Armed 
Forces have got the skill and ability for managing the disaster and they enjoyed 
more experience than any other government officials and organization.
That Armed Forces commander should seek help and technical knowledge from 
expertise while preparing the emergency response plan and thereby the plan will 
be more workable and soundproof.
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Most o f the time the Fire service acts as a first responder in case of fire breakout 
or building collapse in urban areas mainly. Initially it acts as a leading agency but 
when the magnitude is more than the capacity o f the Fire service it’s always the 
Armed Forces who takes control over the situation as an example of destruction 
of Garments factory at SAVAR and MOKHALI and fire break out incident at 
NIMTOLI or NTV office at KAURAN BAZAAR.
Some of the interviewees mentioned that the confidence of the local people may 
not be focused to Armed Forces all time. From his experience he mentioned that 
the confidence mainly depends on the situation and performances of the 
organization.
5.2.4 Integration of NGOs in ICS
The interviewees were asked their comments on integration of NGOs in ICS in 
Bangladesh. Majority has shown their positive attitude but some of them disagreed with 
that. Maximum has mentioned that the NGOs have the contribution for the development 
of this country but the progress was not satisfactory comparing to their received donation 
and ability. The role o f NGOs are never addressed officially by the Government thereby 
they also failed in some of the cases to magnify their efforts in emergency response. The 
comments from interviewers on NGOs are given bellow:
In Bangladesh the NGOs are playing an important role from the very beginning 
but there was no joint effort by NGOs, Armed Forces and Civil Administration so 
far. Lack of accountability and corruption of Government ministries influence the 
donor countries to increase aid to the NGOs thereby they become an important 
factor for the ICS.
• The political leader has got more influence on civil administration but less on 
Armed Forces. In case of NGOs it depends upon their size and shape and 
connectivity with powerful donor agencies.
The NGOs will be more comfortable under supervision of Armed Forces instead 
of the civil administration during emergency response. Because the Armed Forces 
have got more skill than the civil administration, they are cooperative and well 
disciplined force. The NGOs are getting more help and support from Armed 
Forces as they have the capability to provide all shorts of elements like boat in 
case of water way communication.
The NGOs who all are having a well accountability procedure and vast network 
they could play a significant role better than that of concern Government 
ministries.
Some of the interviewees are against the NGO’s integration in Disaster 
management system because the NGO in Bangladesh has never played their 
positive role and the beneficiaries never get the proper help from them. And now 
a day the NGO’s has got trends to influence the government policy and agenda in 
every sector. At present the NGO’s activities have expanded in alarming stage as 
its network is almost bigger than the government one. And some places it 
becomes a challenge for the government service provider to achieve the 
confidence from the local.
Some of the interviewees are strongly against the incorporation of NGO in 
revised SOD 2010 because he believed that the integration of local people in 
disaster management plan will be right step. The dependency on Armed Forces in 
all disaster should be avoided by training the local people and forming up a civil 
defense force in all upazilla level. This civil defense will be stronger than that of a 
NGO in case any disaster. This trained civil defense force can also trained the 
local people in peace time for fighting against the natural disaster.
Fire service could train and equipped a good number o f volunteers with the 
support of some international NGOs and UNDP. These volunteers will enhance 
the overall performance of the Fire service during emergency response.
The NGOs can contribute a lot as they have continues relation with the locality so 
they can provide better knowledge and workable database to Armed Forces. But 
the supervision of NGOs should be in such a way so that it can regulate his usual 
service they way it should be. The strict control of the NGOs may hinder the 
normal progress or development of the disaster management system.
The incorporation of NGO in ICS is a positive step towards a well disaster 
management plan. In ICS, the NGOs can better play under super vision of Armed 
Forces than the civil administration because of the following reason:
-  The command and control shape is well defined and structured than any 
other organization in Bangladesh
-  The Armed Forces never compromises with any indiscipline act or with 
comfortable which is very important for the humanitarian activities.
-  This organization has shown the utmost sincerity and dedication in past 
disaster scenario.
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The integration of NGOs in ISC will help the Armed Forces to get more 
information regarding locality. Also the technical knowledge and expertise from 
NGOs can provide necessary support for preparation of evacuation, search and 
rescue planning. The integration of NGOs will give a scope to them for duel 
performances with other organization and contribute their effort towards 
humanitarian activities
Some of the interviewees mentioned that in Bangladesh the NGOs still couldn’t 
put better performances because of absence of combined approach. He also 
mentioned that the in emergency response phase the Armed Forces can better 
manage the logistical side where as the NGOs can provide better community 
service. The community based development activities or any operation or relief 
distribution the NGOs can provide better service to Armed Forces.
The NGOs especially BRAC, MUSLIMS AID, OXFAM and the other 
international NGOs they are well equipped and having good relation with 
government ministries. The integration of NGOs are well explained in recent 
revised SOD 2010 before hand they have included in our disaster management 
plan but in reality it has been found they are not cooperating well sometime. 
When any responsibilities are given to them they are ignored if it is not tally with 
their own agenda or objectives.
Some of the interviewees mentioned that the accountability and absence of 
control indulged the NGOs with corruption. Other than some well managed 
international NGOs rests of them are fail to prove their efficiency. They suggested 
that those NGOs which are involve with the disaster management plan and its 
development can be monitored by Disaster Management Bureau (DMB). And in 
case of disaster these NGOs can be coordinated or monitored at district level by 
concern local DMB office and thereby the local NGO’s accountability can be 
insured. He mentioned in this aspect one director separately can be appointment 
in DMB for monitoring the activities of the local NGOs over the country. At 
district level the Armed Forces Commander can take support from the local DMB 
office for coordinating the local NGOs for formulating a joint distribution of 
relief material as well as other logistical item
Some of the interviewees mentioned that the NGOs will be more manageable by 
civil administration than that of the Armed Forces. He mentioned that the civil 
administration can coordinate the NGOs activities in a better way at a district 
level as they close relation with them compare to Armed Forces.
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5.2.5 Development of ICS in Bangladesh
The interviewees were requested to give their comments regarding the development of 
ICS in Bangladesh. They have been asked which are the factors may hinder the progress 
for integration o f ICS in Bangladesh perspective. Their valuable comments or suggestions 
are given below:
• The major obstacles to introduce the Incident Command System in Bangladesh 
are the none-cooperative attitude and Ego problem. The inexperience government 
officials sometime deny decentralizing his command and authority.
• Some of the interviewees mentioned that the major obstacles to introduce the 
Incident Command System in Bangladesh are the none-participation of local 
elected body at all level and for the development of ICS we need to introduce the 
civil defense force instead of NGO’s in revised SOD 2010.
In ICS the emergency operation center (EOC) plays an important role but in our 
country still the policy maker couldn’t reach a solution regarding the location of 
the EOC. The location of Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and delegation of 
Authority in ICS are the major exist conflict. The overall manager of EOC must 
be a technical expertise and well experienced on ICS rather to be a bureaucrat.
• The ICS is very new in our country and still we couldn’t developed any define 
policy on ICS knowledge. In Bangladesh the government couldn’t clearly defined 
the command and control authority in ICS context. We still don’t have any 
establishment or facility for impart training or knowledge on ICS to concern 
persons.
• The NGO’s are more ahead to embrace the system of ICS in their organization 
and when the Government ministries and Armed Forces still didn’t prepare any 
ICS structure for their organization. The BRAC which is an international NGO 
and they have already prepared the ICS structure for their own institution.
• The major obstacles to introduce the Incident Command System in Bangladesh 
are the absence of legal framework to implement this system in our disaster 
management process.
Still we don’t have any Disaster Management Act by which the Government can 
implement the ICS in various agencies. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) 
still couldn’t introduce any effective policy by which the community 
involvements can be insured in ICS system. The ICS can play a better role in case 
of emergency response but the entire disaster management can be well
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coordinated by incorporation of Disaster Management Act and Disaster 
Management plan with the contingency plan of various organizations.
5.3 Summary of Findings
The summary of findings is given below:
The maximum interviewees mentioned that there should be balanced of 
command and control at district level. The Armed Force Commander may 
become the IC but at the same time it has to be followed by a 
constitutional process and for limited time.
• The IC should be a trained personal on ICS and experienced on disaster 
management process.
The IC from Armed Forces should have the command control authority 
over their troops and rest of the coordination at district level should have 
done by the DC.
• The elected political figure like MP should be introduced in ICS structure 
for acting as an organizer for forming up the local volunteers and 
motivating the local people, raising their demand and need to authority. 
The NGOs should be controlled by the DMB at district level. The DMB 
will have the accountability of the NGOs which are involved with the 
development of the DM.
The NGOs should contribute their technical knowledge for planning and 
operation during emergency response to Armed Forces.
The IC shouldn’t directly control the NGOs. This part can be done by 
DMB and they can ensure the active support from the NGOs.
• The operational and logistics section should be controlled by the Armed 
Forces.
• The finance branch from Logistics Section should only be controlled by 
the DC or any nominated person by DC.
Government should introduce the DM act and policy for developing the 
action framework for the Armed Forces.
The Government should introduce number of training and workshop for 
the development of ICS.
• The Armed Forces, Civil administration should introduce the training on 
ICS for their concern officer.
C H A PTER  6
PROPOSED ACTION FRAMEWORKS 
OF ARMED FORCES IN ICS
6.1 Proposed Incident Command System Model at District level
When the incident is small in size, the command group may be small basing on that 
incident. In that case the incident command group may be formed by the Incident 
Commander (IC) along with him there might be one or more Deputy Incident 
Commander to assist the IC or release him for monitoring other activities. In case o f 
Bangladesh the population density is large compared to developed countries. The same 
magnitude incident in a developed country may not be equal for Bangladesh because o f 
the intensity o f the incident. As an example if there is a fire break out incident taking 
place in Canada the affected people will be very less as there houses are located having 
enough space and the inhabitants are also less per square kilometer (only 3.4). The same 
incident if happened in Bangladesh the affected people will be more because the 
population density per square kilometer is more (1,127)) in our country. Again the houses 
are congested in our country which helps the fire to spread in a large area within a short 
notice. So in our country perspective most o f the incidents are large and involve a number 
of agencies in emergency response operation.
Here we will only consider the district level In Bangladesh the entire district are quite 
small compare to its population size. In any emergency response operation it needs a huge 
effort by number o f  agencies to rescue evacuation and support the affected people 
especially at district level. The following section there will be three proposed model for 
ICS at district level will be represented basing on the following factors like:
Suggestions o f the interviewees
Example o f the neighbors’ countries
Based on the main structure o f the Incident command system
6.1.1 ICS model -1 (Delegation of Authority)
There is a District Disaster M anagement Committee (DDMC) at the District level. The 
DDMC consists o f the Deputy Commissioner o f the District as the chairperson and 
members comprising all District level department heads, NGO leaders and civil society 
members. District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO) acts as member secretary o f 
the committee. M embers o f Parliament act as advisors o f the committees. In the proposed 
ICS model the DC will be act as a superior officer because he is the highest government 
official as well as he is the chairperson o f the District Disaster M anagement Committee
(DDMC) at district level. When any disaster occurred he will activate his DDMC. He will 
activate his own ICS structure at district level. Basing on the prepared contingency plan 
for managing the disaster at district level he will act as an incident commander if he is 
trained on ICS or someone nominated as a Responsible Officer (RO) from Government at 
district level. A Nodal Officer (NO) has to be designated for proper coordination between 
the District and National level in activating air support for response. When the situation 
is going out o f  control or the capability o f  the civil administration at district level. The 
DC/RO may call for support from state level or Armed Forces. After arrival o f the Armed 
Forces, the DC/RO may delegate his authority to the representative from Armed Forces 
provided that he is well trained and experienced regarding ICS. The representative or the 
officer from Armed Forces will take the charge o f Incident Com m ander from DC/RO. He 
will restructure the ICS by incorporating the military components on that. As an example 
the operation section can be manned by the District fire service officer for the rescue and 
evacuation as first responder. Afterwards the Armed Forces comm ander may take the 
charge o f that section but the rest o f the member from district level may stay there to 
assist him.
Likewise all the section will be reactivated and reorganize when the Commander from 
Armed Force will take the charge o f Incident Commander on behalf o f the DC/RO. But 
he will prepare his Incident Action Plan (IAP) and Incident Objectives concerning with 
DC/RO. DC/RO will inform his own authority regarding progress o f  the incident and the 
activities following his own channel o f command. At district level the operation and 
logistics section should command by the Armed Force Com m ander as maximum 
resources and manpower will be utilized from Armed Forces. In case o f planning section 
one representative from Armed Forces should be the member for provide necessary 
information regarding the capability o f  the Armed Forces. The NGOs and political 
elected person from the DDMC will incorporated in their designated place. The NGOs 
can play a better role providing necessary database o f local population and technical 
knowledge for smooth planning o f rescue, evacuation and relief distribution. They can 
help to prepare the initial and detail need assessment with jo int effort with other 
Government agencies and Armed Forces. The local elected political figure from the 
DDMC can be act as an advisor or they can raise the demand o f the local affected people 
while planning for relief especially. They can motivate the people to withstand with the 
disaster. In time o f emergency response the volunteers are blessing and disturbing 
elements both. It is the manager who can utilize these elements in a better way. Because 
in time o f emergency the volunteers can be prepared with short notice and they can work
as substitute for the ICS personal and manage time for rest which is very essential for 
them. So the political elected figure can be act a well manager to coordinate and 
organized the local people within a short notice in this regard. The political figure and 
NGOs can provide their valuable support and advice in planning and operation section. 
And rest o f the command staff can be nominated by IC from both civil administration and 
Armed Forces. The general staff can be formed up from civil administration and Armed 
Forces both basing on the purpose o f the particular section. The logistics section will have 
a separate branch like finance branch which will maintain all the financial issue related 
with emergency response operation. So there will be no separate finance and admin 
section under IC, it will be deviated a bit with main ICS structure.
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Figure 6.1: Proposed ICS model -1
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6.1.1.1 Advantage o f ICS model-1
The proposed ICS m odel-1 has the following advantages:
• This model doesn’t disturb the present exist governmental structure.
• In this model the Armed Forces representative act as an Incident 
Com m ander on behalf o f the DC, so the Armed Force remains as a 
supporting role.
• The elected political leader and concern NGOs are well incorporated in 
planning and operation section which will increase the efficiency o f  the 
proposed ICS.
• The proposed ICS incorporate the finance and admin section as a part o f 
finance branch under logistic section which will minimize the extra 
m anpower and makes the ICS structure simpler.
• Inclusion o f the NODAL officer for coordination and conducting air 
operation will help the rescue and relief operation easier.
6.1.1.2 Disadvantage o f ICS model-1
The proposed ICS model -1 has the following disadvantages:
• The Armed Force act as a supporting role during emergency response 
operation and it remain under direct command and control o f the defense 
minister through Armed Forces Division (AFD). So it can’t work under 
DC at district level.
• The Armed Force commander can’t act as an Incident commander until he 
get the training on the ICS
Still in Bangladesh we don’t have the training on ICS for the AFD 
personal.
• The Armed Force commander may not have well knowledge and relation 
with NGOs/Political leader so it will be difficult for them to get full 
support from the NGOs.
• If the DC is not trained on ICS then the responsible officer (RO) 
nominated from the Government may not be well oriented with rest o f the 
Government and Non Governmental agencies who all are working in that 
district.
• The incorporation o f elected political leader and NGOs at section level 
(Operation and Planning) may downgrade their status and importance in 
ICS.
Direct dealing with the political leader and NGOs may not bring 
satisfactory result for the IC (Armed Forces Representative) as the 
military has limited scope to develop good relationship with them.
6.1.1.3 Suggestion for Proposed ICS model-1
The proposed ICS model -1 needs to introduce the training on ICS especially to 
personal (Rank of Major and Lieutenant Colonel) from AFD. The same training 
should give to all the DC’s periodically. The RO should be nominated or 
designated by the Government before the disaster so that the RO can orient 
himself with his area o f responsibility (AOR). The control o f NGOs can be done 
by the local Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) at district level. DMB will only 
deal with those NGOs who all are working on Disaster management related 
project. The involvement o f political leader can be done in higher level as they are 
the elected person in that area. Basing on their status they can provide their 
support through coordination with DC and IC.
6.1.2 ICS model -2 (Parallel command and control authority)
In The proposed ICS model -  2, the DC and the representative from AFD will act parallel 
as a District coordinator and as an Incident Commander respectively.
Figure 6.2: Proposed ICS model -2
When the catastrophe will be beyond the district's capability DC will then ask the support 
from the AFD. So it will give scope to the Armed Force Com m ander to act as an 1C at 
district level or when the DS will be failed to manage the disaster then he will delegate 
the authority to Armed Force Commander to work independently. Armed Force 
commander will be act as an IC and at the same time he will take necessary help and 
support from the DC as he has good relation and control over the governmental ministries 
in his area o f jurisdiction. The IC or the commander from AFD will keep contact with DC 
and before taking any decision he will discuss with the DC. And rest o f the part like 
activation o f ICS will be carried out according to instructions from IC. And selection o f 
command staff and general staff will be according to ICS m odel-1. In this model the role 
o f NGOs and political elected figure will be a bit different. The political elected figure or 
the leader will direct contact with the DC and provide necessary support or raise the local 
people demand to authority. The NGOs will not directly involve with the Armed Forces 
personal in Planning or Operation section like ICS model-1 rather they will delegate their 
support and technical knowledge through the Disaster M anagement Bureau (DMB).
6.1.2.1 Advantage o f  ICS model-2
The proposed ICS model -2 has the following advantages:
• At district level both the governmental Administration like military and 
civil administration enjoy the parallel authority on its own men and 
material.
• The command control authority remains with AFD.
• The DC will act as District Coordinator and provide all necessary support 
to IC from Armed Forces division.
• The Operation section and logistics section will be manned by AFD and 
the other related agencies will provide their support through the 
coordination process by DC.
• The DC will make a bridge with the IC (AFD Personal) and Political 
elected leader.
• The NGOs will be control and coordinated by the district Disaster 
M anagement Bureau (DMB) for smooth functioning.
6.1.2.2 Disadvantage o f  ICS model-2
The proposed ICS model -2 has the following disadvantages:
• The DC will not enjoy the superior authority like ICS m odel-1.
• The Armed Force Representative may not have the training on ICS which 
will
■ Hinder the progress o f ICS.
• The command control authority will be in charge o f AFD representative 
which is not commensurate with the present Government structure at 
district level.
• The NGO s may face bureaucratic problem with DMB which may delay 
the process
• Direct contact with Political leader may influence the DC for undue 
privilege like more share o f relief in his own men or area. And disturb the 
relief plan o f the district.
6.1.2.3 Suggestion fo r  Proposed ICS model-2
The proposed ICS model-2 has got some disadvantages which may create some 
problem in command control authority in model -  2. To avoid those problems the 
following procedure can be carried out.
• The Armed Forces Division should introduce the training on ICS in unit 
level as soon as possible.
• The DMB should have the database regarding the local NGOs who all are 
working on disaster management related issues.
• The DMB should have all the technical data and accountability o f local 
NGOs, so that can ensure the best possible service from NGOs.
• The Government should augment the D M B’s manpower to manage the 
local NGOs at district level
• The incorporation o f political leader should introduce in planning and 
decision making process. And thereby it will minimize the interference o f 
the political leader while distribution o f relief material.
• The integration o f DC, IC and elected political leader at district level 
should form a group. Thus it will help them to prepare the Incident Action 
Plan (IAP) and objective o f the Incident.
• When the political leader will be a part o f the decision making group or 
part o f  ICS structure he will have less scope o f interference in planning o f
relief distribution.
• In the group the presence o f Armed Force personal may have some 
influence over the political leader in our country perspective. And it will 
create confidence to DC dealing with political leader.
6.1.3 ICS m odel -3 (U nified C om m and G roup)
The proposed ICS model-3 will form a unified command group at district level. Because 
at district level in Bangladesh the incident size and shape is large this involves number o f 
agencies. So this unified command group will help the ICS to develop an IAP and 
Incident based objectives at district level. Maximum interviewer expressed their mind that 
the three components at district level are very important these are the DC, Armed Force 
Commander and political leader. In unified command group the IC will be the Armed 
Force comm ander as he is arriving when the civil administration is not capable o f 
managing the disaster. In such a case the delegation o f authority o f  ICS also 
commensurate with the ICS concept. In Unified Command group the DC will act as 
coordinator as he is well oriented in his area o f jurisdiction. The IC will be performed by 
the Armed Forces Com m ander or representative as maximum time the personal from 
Armed Force possess the experience o f managing the disaster. And the elected political 
leader can act as advisor; he can manage the volunteer group in need within a short 
notice. The local elected political figure at district level is the Parliament M ember (MP). 
We believe it is not realistic to expect a MP to suddenly materialize after a catastrophe. 
By the same token, it is unrealistic to attempt to train every MP in the nuance o f the DM 
ACT, ICS and SOD or emergency response. The MP is changed each after 5 years. So it 
will be difficult to train the MP on ICS. In other hand the MPs fundamentally, has a 
policy and strategic role in their area o f jurisdiction. And the DCs are mainly the manager 
o f their area o f  jurisdiction. Yet after a disaster, the political leader or MP becomes the 
face o f their local area and, both for the people affected and the rest o f  the country. 
Keeping in mind that the survivors o f the event will likely have access to at least radio, 
local MPs performance has an enormous impact on how the community as a whole 
behaves. The only objective here is to help, console and calm the masses at the face o f a 
very devastating catastrophe. A significant portion o f this can only be done by the local 
MP or political elected leader or he or she is the face and voice o f the affected community 
during the critical initial stages o f the event. Therefore this unified command group 
includes the local MPs for their important role. Beside that in our country it has been
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common practice that the political leaders are trying to interfere the relief distribution and 
it creates difficulties for the administration.
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Figure 6.3: ICS model -3
To overcome the problem the incorporation o f political leader in unified command group 
will make them more responsible. When any disaster will take place and this unified 
command group will activated and sit in a common forum. They will prepare the initial 
need assessments with support from the technical expertise where the DC, IC and the 
political leader will give their inputs. Basing on this need assessment the planning and 
operation section will prepare their plan and carry out the execution part. Initially it may 
create some difficulties but in the long run the political interfere will be less.
During emergency response period the volunteer community is both a blessing and a 
problem at the same time. On the one hand, the availability o f additional manpower can 
relieve professionals to focus more on rescue efforts. On the other hand, the volunteers 
must be organized and often re-trained in short orientation sessions, before deployment. 
The unified command group can play a vital role in this aspect. The political leader from 
the unified command group can organize the volunteer at district level. They can motivate 
the people from their own party as well from locality and arrange short training before the 
deployment. They can contribute a lot to form up the civil defense force at district level 
which can be a local resource for the district.
From the practice it has been found that the Armed Force has an important role in every 
disaster in case o f Planning, Operation and logistics. So it will be justified to make an 
Incident Commander from AFD personal. But at the same time the IC will take all 
necessary action or decision after coordination with DC and elected political leader in 
unified command group. It will be better for IC to share his responsibility as a form of 
coordination with other member in unified command group at district level. The NGOs 
will be better utilized if they control and monitored by the local DMB officers in 
connection with DC. Because they have the better knowledge regarding NGOs and they 
know each o f the NGOs agenda and capability. So they can provide better inputs to IC 
regarding planning o f relief and other operation activities. In this aspect the DMB need 
the authority for controlling the local NGOs who all are working on disaster related 
issues.
There should be a nodal officer who will coordinate the Air Operation activities in 
connection with IC and DC at district level. He will act as an Air operation coordination 
officer at district level. He will get the demand o f the Air support from the Operation 
section and concerning with IC and DC he will ensure this demand. The DC will have an
important role in unified command group otherwise he also play the role o f incident 
commander for the Government organization (GO) and Non Government Organization 
(NGO) or agencies who all are working in his area o f  jurisdiction. He will mainly 
coordinate all the GO, NGO and provide all the necessary support for the IC. He will 
have the communication with IC as well as his higher authority for informing the progress 
o f the emergency response activities in his district.
In this model the Operation section and logistics section should be manned by the Armed 
Forces and a representative from Armed Forces can be participated in the planning 
section for providing the necessary inputs. The political leader can send his representative 
to provide their information to planning section. The DMB should nominate the 
representative from local NGOs who can provide information from the NGOs 
community. The command staff will be selected by the IC him self from Civil or Military 
Administration (AFD) both. The same way the general staff will be included with their 
respective agencies. The logistics section will have a separate branch for finance and 
administration. This branch should handle by the respective government organization at 
district level. And DC can have the access to monitor and control o f that particular 
branch.
6.1.3.1 Advantage o f ICS model-3
The proposed ICS model has got the following advantages:
• The Unified Command group is ensured the equal participation o f the DC, 
IC and elected local political leader role in ICS.
• The Unified command group ensures the proof planning and operation o f 
the emergency response activities.
• The Unified Command group ensures the accountability and balanced o f 
command, control authority between three components like Civil and 
M ilitary administration (AFD) and Political party as well.
• The presence o f Armed Forces personal in Unified Command group helps
to make a balanced between political leader and DC.
• The active participation o f local elected political figure in Unified
Command Group will ensure the forming up the civil defense force at 
district level, which will be a trained force in the process o f time. In 
future it will enhance the capability o f  D istrict’s capability to manage 
any disaster
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• The political figure in unified command group will ensure that the
demands o f local people are fulfilled by the service provider.
•  The political leader can play a vital role to motivate the affected people in
crisis time and can help the Armed Forces to control the law and order 
situation in the affected area.
• The DMB can help the Armed Force Commander providing the NGOs
support in time and correctly.
• The DMB can nominate the right man to represent the NGOs community
at district level.
6.1.3.2 Disadvantage o f ICS model-3
The proposed ICS model has got the following disadvantages:
• The Unified Command group is very new concept in our country. So it
will take time to understand by all.
• The presence o f Political leader in Unified Command Group may create
some problem at the beginning but it will be minimized in the long run
• The political leader may influence the planning for relief distribution
basing on vote bank issue and others.
• The political figure may try to incorporate his party supporter as 
volunteers in ICS structure and disturb the distribution o f relief material.
•  The political leader may influence the local people for his own political
interest and which may create negative impact towards the ICS personal.
• The NGOs may show nonparticipation attitude towards DMB due to
bureaucratic interference or problem.
• The separate branch in logistics section for the finance which will be
manage by the respective civil authority may create some problem as the 
logistic section will be controlled by the Armed Forces.
6.1.3.3 Suggestion fo r  Proposed ICS model-3
The proposed ICS model-3 has got some disadvantages to avoid those problems 
the following suggestion can be followed:
• The political leader can be trained at district level to make aware about
their responsibility in Unified Command Group.
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• The finance branch can be set up as a section and it can be managed by 
the government official nominated by DC.
• The DMB should develop a healthy relation with NGOs at district level.
• DMB should control and have the accountability o f  the local NGOs with 
matured management.
• The AFD should nominate the Armed Forces representative at district 
level with the qualification on ICS training and experienced on disaster 
management.
•  The DC should have training on ICS for smooth coordination with other 
agencies.
• Prior to any disaster there should be a good number o f training, 
workshop and model discussion on ICS at district level which will help 
the responder agencies to know each other capability and developing a 
good relation among them.
• All the responder should introduce the ICS in their agency which will 
help them to accumulate their ICS structure with the ICS o f the District 
during emergency response period.
6.2 Proposed C om m unication system  for ICS m odel-3
Successful communications and information management require that emergency 
m anagement/response personnel and their affiliated organizations use standardized 
communications types. The following is a list o f  standardized communication types:
• Strategic Communications: High-level directions, including resource priority 
decisions, roles and responsibilities determinations, and overall incident response 
courses o f action.
• Tactical Communications: Communications between command and support 
elements and, as appropriate, cooperating agencies and organizations.
• Support Communications: Coordination in support o f strategic and tactical 
communications (for example, communications among hospitals concerning 
resource ordering, dispatching, and tracking from logistics centers; traffic and 
public works communications).
• Public Address Communications: Emergency alerts and warnings, press
O I
Information flow among all stakeholders is crucial, but interoperability presents 
additional challenges when nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, 
and critical infrastructure owners and operators are considered. All relevant stakeholders 
should be involved in meetings and planning sessions in order to formulate more 
thorough and integrated communications plans and strategies. Technology and equipment 
standards also should be shared when appropriate, to provide stakeholders with the 
opportunity to be interoperable and compatible. Basing on the following consideration for 
proposed ICS model -3 the following communication system can be followed:
The Prime M inister (PM) will be the national focal point for disaster management 
process. She/He is the chairperson o f the National Disaster M anagement Committee. And 
by virtue o f his appointment she/he also holds the defense minister appointment in 
Bangladesh. The communication system will follow the diagram as it mentioned above. 
The DC from the Unified Command Group at District level will get the instructions from 
the prime minister through NDMC and DMB. The Political leader will get the PM ’s 
political agenda regarding disaster from his political party. The IC or the representative 
from Armed Forces will get their instruction in both the way. As a member o f the NDMC 
and as a member o f the Armed Forces the PSO will get the instruction from NDMC and 
Defense ministry both. The Unified Command Group will follow their own line o f 
communication for receiving and delivering the information. The interoperability will be 
maintained in the Unified Command Group for better coordination and controlling the 
entire ICS management at district level.
Figure 6.4: Passage o f Information for ICS model-3
The IC will also introduce the interoperability among the difference responders who will 
work in various sections. For an example in Logistic section there might be mix o f 
elements like Ordnance elements from Armed Forces, technical specialist from 
Government elements or NGOs. In that case the Branch In charges should have the
similar type o f communication equipment for sharing information and instructions among 
them
Figure 6.5: Communication within a Section
The entire ICS should develop a common communication system. They should use 
common terminology and avoid different type o f sign for marking various areas. 
Specially while working with civil administration the Armed Forces should have some 
alternative communication which will help them to communicate with their counterpart. 
The Armed Forces should not use the military terminology while working with civil 
administration. The entire ICS should develop some alternative measures in case o f 
failure o f normal communication line. The alternative communications network may have 
wireless, satellite phones, cell phones, radios etc.
6.3 Recommendations
The above mentioned proposed ICS model represents the command, control and 
coordination in a different way. Among those the ICS model-3 is the most suitable 
structure for ICS at District level. And this structure fulfills the demand o f necessity and it 
doesn’t disturb the present government structure. The Unified Command Group also 
ensures the balance o f authority within three most important factors at District level. In 
our country this concept still is very new and we yet to develop any defined structure 
where the Armed Forces and Civil Administration can work together. In Bangladesh 
perspective it has been found that the terminology o f command and control is creating
ambiguity among the different organizations but the coordination terminology is more 
suitable. Basing on that concept the ICS model tries to establish a framework where the 
coordination is the main driving force. The following recommendations are shorted out 
for implementation o f proposed ICS model -3:
• The political leader can be trained at district level to make aware about their 
responsibility in Unified Command Group.
• The finance branch can be set up as a section and it can be managed by the 
government official nominated by DC.
• The DMB should develop a healthy relation with NGOs at district level.
• DMB should control and have the accountability o f the local NGOs with 
matured management.
• The AFD should nominate the Armed Forces representative at district level 
with the qualification on ICS training and experienced in disaster 
management.
• The DC should have training on ICS for smooth coordination with other 
agencies.
• Prior to any disaster there should be a good number o f  training, workshop and 
model discussion on ICS at district level which will help the responder 
agencies to know each others capability and developed a good relation among 
them.
• All the responders should introduce the ICS in their agencies which will help 
them to accumulate their ICS structure with the ICS o f the District during 
emergency response period.
• The local volunteer can be organized and trained with the guidance and 
support o f the local elected political leader and thereby this volunteer can 
form strong civil defense force at District level and minimize the dependency 
on the Armed Forces.
• The Government should introduce policy regarding the communication and 
usable common word for disaster. Government should introduce the Disaster 
M anagement Act and policy. Basing on what the structure o f ICS can be 
developed.
• The Government should give the authority to DMB to m onitor and have 
accountability o f  the NGOs who all are specially working on disaster related 
issues.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS
The Armed Forces is an important element for the modern world in case o f  any operation 
that might be the war or any type o f natural disaster. The operation readiness, logistic 
support and high mobility have proved its worthiness in any situation. In developed and 
developing countries the Armed Forces participated in many occasions and worked 
jointly in emergency response operation. The distinct chain o f command and discipline 
make the Armed Forces differences from the civil administration. But it feels necessity to 
develop some management system which can help both the civil and military 
administration for joint operation. The USA Fire Department o f  California in 1970 first 
developed the system named Incident Command system (ICS) which help them to fight 
against the wild fire successfully. The ICS has got defined chain o f command and specific 
responsibilities for each individual which is similar to Military chain o f command. 
Actually the ICS was developed from the military mechanism o f command and control.
It has got the similarity with military pattern o f command and control. But as a starting 
point, it is critical for the military to understand the civilian approach to organizational 
management and how ICS fits into the civilian world. To be blunt, there is no common 
doctrine or hardly anything that would be recognized as such for day-to-day operations. 
Leadership and management are unique to each institution and office. In our country the 
ICS is a new concept, still we are lacking behind from others. India and Sri Lanka already 
prepared their policies and DM Act. Basing on that they are now developing the ICS for 
their Country. India has introduced Guideline for Incident Response System. In our 
country we don’t have any paper on that.
In our country the frequency and intensity o f  the disaster is high and involvement o f 
Armed Forces is increasing. Still we don’t have any developed ICS for our country as 
well as we don’t have any defined ICS structure for conducting smooth joint operation o f 
Civil and military elements. In maximum time it has been found that the Armed Forces 
are taking initiative to respond any type o f disaster violating the normal rules. On the 
contrary the Government agencies are showing inactiveness out o f  fear o f military or their 
unwillingness to be active. So in this regard we need a defined structure o f ICS where the 
action framework will automatically detect the individual responsibility and procedure o f 
dealings with the emergency response activities. In our country the Armed Forces are
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deployed normally basing on district level. So this paper is trying to propose an action 
framework for the Armed Forces personal at district level in the context o f ICS. This 
paper is trying to focus on the important factors like CMR and role o f NGOs and the role 
o f DC on present Government structure with the connection o f political leader.
In Bangladesh the ICS should be developed as soon as possible in every organization. 
Bangladesh Government should develop policy on the relationship between Armed 
Forces and Civil society. The DM act should be developed a policy on communication 
system in ICS should be introduced in our country. The Government o f Bangladesh 
should form civil volunteers who can act as emergency responders at district level. The 
Government should gradually make some district resources like State Disaster Response 
Force (SDRF) in India. The SDRF is now playing an alternative role o f Indian Armed 
Forces. The ICS is entirely a management system or tool, so this tool can be made in a 
way so that it can be well merged with all the emergency responders without any trouble 
and enhance their capability to contribute more in any disaster.
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ANNEXURE
Case study -1 
Interviewers Name; A l.
Profile: A l is an environmentalist, who obtained PhD in Hydrogeology in 1986 from
Azerbaijan State University, Baku, USSR. He has working experience with UN, UNDP, 
Ministry o f Food and Forest.
Interview date and time: 06 Novem ber 10, 0900-1030 hrs 
Duration: 1 hrs 30 minutes.
Analysis of Interview:
Command and Control: A l specifically gave his opinion that military or Armed 
Forces should work under the Government representative at all level. He also mentioned that 
in many cases it has been found that military or the Armed Forces played the leading role 
especially in emergency response period but it will be better for all if the District 
Commissioner (DC) or Thana Nirbahi Officer (TNO) act as a superior officer respectively at 
District or Upazilla level. He mentioned that if the situation needs in that case the Armed 
Force can directly control the entire activities providing that the Army commander has 
nominated by the DC or TNO for a specific time period.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): A l mentioned that the presence o f Armed Forces 
ensures the accountability and reduce the rate o f corruption. It indicates that people may have 
some fear on Armed Forces, in some case it may positive or negative as well. But overall 
CMR is healthy and comfortable for conducting a well planned emergency response activity 
during Disaster.
Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s: The
relation between civil administration and military is moderate and has got less influence by 
civil bureaucrats when the Armed Force is act as a leading agency. The NGOs are working
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independent in their respective Area o f Responsibility (AOR). The operation plan for rescue 
or evacuation or the relief distribution plan are made by the Armed Forces and maximum 
times these plan are approved by the civil administration without any interfere.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. In ICS the 
incorporation o f NGO has been mentioned. In Bangladesh the NGOs are playing an 
important role from the very beginning but there was no jo in t effort by NGOs, Armed Forces 
and Civil Administration so far. And he mentioned clearly by setting his personal working 
experience in World Bank that the donor countries become happy to see if Bangladesh 
Government could consumed its total foreign aid 20 to 30 percent. Lack o f accountability and 
corruption o f Government ministries influence the donor countries to increase aid to the 
NGOs. But again he mentioned that all the NGOs are not same, some may doesn’t have the 
well accountability procedure.
Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: A l mentioned that the people 
o f our country have got the confidence more in Armed Forces than any other agencies or 
NGOs. He mentioned that people think that when Army took the control over the situation 
the possibility o f  corruption decreases. And Army has got more mobility, Good 
communication, well coordinated approach and it’s a disciplined force. Because o f these 
contribution people feel more confidence on Armed Forces.
Political Interfere: A 1 mentioned that the Bangladesh present perspective its very natural 
to interference o f the political leader specially in relief distribution. The political leader has 
got more influence on civil administration but less on Armed Forces. In case o f NGOs it 
depends upon their size and shape and connectivity with powerful donor agencies. Even 
though the political leaders try to influence the local NGOs some time.
Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: He mentioned that depending on the 
high mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces, but they have lack o f technical knowledge and the local database which is
Supervision of NGOs: He mentioned that the NGOs will be more comfortable under
supervision o f Armed forces instead o f the Civil administration during emergency response. 
Because the Army has got more skill than the civil administration, they are cooperative and 
well disciplined force. The NGOs are getting more help and support from Army as they have 
the capability to provide all shorts o f elements like boat in case o f water way communication.
NGOs Performance: He mentioned that the NGOs who all are having a well
accountability procedure and vast network they could play a significant role better than that 
o f concern Government ministries.
Development of ICS in Bangladesh: He mentioned that the major obstacles to introduce the 
Incident Command System in Bangladesh are the none-cooperative attitude and Ego 
problem. He also mentioned that the inexperience government officials sometime deny 
decentralizing his command and authority.
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Case Study-2
Interviewers Name: A2.
Profile: A2, he was the former UN disaster planner and water expert who work and
research on flood and managing the disaster. At present he is working as a Senior lecturer in 
BUET and BRAC.
Interview date and time: 02 December 10, 1700-1820 hrs 
Duration: 1 hrs 20 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Command and Control: A2 specifically gave his opinion that military or Armed 
Forces should work under the Government representative at all level. He also mentioned that 
in many cases it has been found that military or the Armed Forces played the leading role 
especially in emergency response period but it will be better for all if in Upazilla level beside 
the Thana Nirbahi Officer (TNO) the elected government body like the Upazilla Chairman 
also incorporated in decision making group at Upazilla level. He mentioned that if the 
situation needs in that case the Armed Force can directly control the entire activities 
providing that the Army commander has been nominated for that particular area by the 
Government before the disaster takes place and he should work as a commander for a 
specific time period. He also mentioned that at Upazilla level the TNO, Armed Forces 
commander at Upazilla level and the Upazilla Chairman these 03 men should work as in a 
coordinated way and the Armed forces commander may act as a ch ief coordinator in that 
case if the situation needs.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): A2 also mentioned that the presence o f Armed Forces 
ensures the accountability and reduce the rate o f corruption. He said that the presence relation 
between Armed Forces and civil administration is not bad.
Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s: A2
mentioned that the relation between civil administration and military is moderate. He was 
against the N G O ’s integration in Disaster management system because basing on his long 
experience he mentioned that the NGO in Bangladesh has never played his positive role and
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the beneficiaries never get the proper help from them. And now a day the N G O ’s has got 
trends to influence the government policy and agenda in every sector. At present the N G O ’s 
activities have expanded in alarming stage as its network is almost bigger than the 
government one. And some places it becomes a challenge for the government service 
provider to achieve the confidence from the local.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. In ICS the 
incorporation o f NGO has been mentioned. A2 is strongly against the incorporation o f NGO 
in revised SOD 2010 because he believed that the integration o f local people in disaster 
management plan will be right step. The dependency on Armed Forces in all disaster should 
be avoided by training the local people and forming up a civil defense force in all upazilla 
level. This civil defense will be stronger than that o f a NGO in case any disaster. This trained 
civil defense force can also trained the local people in peace time for fighting against the 
natural disaster.
Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: A2 gave emphasis to Armed 
forces specially to coordinate all operation like rescue, evacuation and relief. He said that still 
in Bangladesh the Armed Forces has got the confidence from the general mass and they 
believed that only the Armed Forces can distribute the relief material without any 
interference from political party or corruption.
Political Interfere: A2 mentioned that only Armed Forces is the only organized and 
disciplined force in Bangladesh which is free from all interference.
Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: He mentioned that depending on the 
high mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces. Still this organization can take lead in any disaster in Bangladesh.
NGOs Performance: He mentioned that the NGOs has got some success or good
performance in early disaster but in overall picture this NGO is still not achieved that 
efficiency in Bangladesh to manage the disaster alone.
A 5
Development of ICS in Bangladesh; He mentioned that the major obstacles to introduce the 
Incident Command System in Bangladesh are the none-participation o f local elected body at 
all level and introduce the civil defense force instead o f N G O ’s in revised SOD 2010. He 
mentioned that a local chairman is more oriented than a TNO or an Armed Forces 
commander in an upazilla level. And this is applicable in all level. He especially gave 
emphasis on Upazilla level because in district level the area o f jurisdiction is very large. So 
the upazilla is an ideal unit to establish any ideal model. To activate a proper ICS system at 
upazilla level he said the incident command group or unified command group should be 
formed up by three men . They are as follows:
1) The Local government high officials ( TNO at Upazilla level)
2) The Local Armed Forces Commander ( Nominated by Armed Forces 
Division)
3) The Local elected government body ( The upazilla Chairman)
A2 gave an example on Republic people o f China. In China the comm unist party has got its 
elected men at lower government jurisdictional areas, where they work along with 
governmental officials. The party people mainly work basing on the party political idolism 
and agenda as well as the local people demand. And the governmental official’s duty is to 
fulfill these agendas by following the governmental policies and rules and regulation. So this 
combined approach o f elected figure or political representative and government officials 
successfully accomplish the goal o f the government. So A2 told if in upazilla level the 
elected political body integrated in decision making process he can organize his party people 
as well as the local people for any job and the governmental high official can supervise the 
legal aspects. And the overall operation, rescue and relief distribution activities can be 
coordinated by the local Armed Forces Commander.
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Case Study-3
Interviewers Name: A3.
Interview date and time: 19 December 10, 1545 -1700 hrs.
Duration: 1 hrs 15 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Command and Control: A3 mentioned that in case o f any disaster the command 
should be under the command o f Armed Force Com m ander but the control and coordination 
should be managed by civil administration. He also mentioned basing his own working 
experience in emergency response that at higher level there is no ambiguity regarding the 
delegation o f authority or the command control issues but it exists at lower level.
Local Elected/ Political Leader: A3 mentioned that the integration o f political leader 
has great impact on disaster management process especially it will have a important role on 
ICS. During emergency response the political leader are the main driving forces that can 
organize the local affected people and gave them consolation and inspire for fight against the 
disaster. The local political leader can play an important role to manage the local volunteer in 
case o f any emergency response operation within a short notice.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): A3 expressed his positive attitude on existing CMR in 
the country. He said that the present CMR is ensuring better disaster management during 
emergency response.
Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s:
The relation between civil administration and military is moderate and has got less influence 
by civil bureaucrats when the Armed Force is act as a leading agency. The NGOs are 
working independent in their respective Area o f Responsibility (AOR). The operation plan 
for rescue or evacuation or the relief distribution plan are made by the Armed Forces and 
maximum times these plan are approved by the civil administration without any interfere. But
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A3 expressed his mind that Armed Forces commander should seek help and technical 
knowledge from expertise while preparing the emergency response plan and thereby the plan 
will be more workable and soundproof.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. In ICS the 
incorporation o f NGO has been mentioned. In Bangladesh the NGOs are playing an 
important role from the very beginning but there was no jo in t effort by NGOs, Armed Forces 
and Civil Administration so far. And he mentioned by setting his personal working 
experience in Fire service that with the support o f some international NGOs and UNDP they 
could trained and equipped a good number o f volunteers which will enhance the overall 
performance o f the Fire service during emergency response. He mentioned that they are 
preparing 200 local trained volunteers for each local Fire service station when the crisis time 
will arise the responsible officer from local Fire service will organized these volunteers with 
the help o f local political leader within a short notice. These 200 local volunteers will form 5 
groups for caring out search, rescue, evacuation and First Aid. Each group will comprise o f 
40 members.
Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: He mentioned that still the 
people o f Bangladesh has more confidence on Armed Forces than any other organization in 
the country. He mentioned from his experience that maximum time the Fire service acts as a 
first responder. Initially it acts as a leading agency but when the magnitude is more than the 
capacity o f  the Fire service its always the Armed Forces who takes control over the situation 
as an example o f destruction o f Garments factory at SAVAR and fire break out incident at 
NIMTOLI.
Political Interfere: A3 mentioned that interference is always there in both cases like civil 
or military administration but its obvious that the interference is less in case o f Armed forces 
when take control over the relief distribution. In case o f NGOs it depends upon their size and 
shape and connectivity with powerful donor agencies. Even though the political leaders try to 
influence the local NGOs some time.
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Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: He mentioned that still the Armed 
forces have got the leading role in any type o f disaster in Bangladesh. Basing on its high 
mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces, but they have lack o f technical knowledge and the local database which is 
very essential for caring out any assessment. A3 mentioned that the NGOs can play a better 
role in that aspect.
Supervision of NGOs: He mentioned that the NGOs can contribute a lot as they have
continues relation with the locality so they can provide better knowledge and workable 
database to Armed Forces. But the supervision o f NGOs should be in such a way so that it 
can regulate his usual service they way it should be. The strict control o f  the NGOs may 
hinder the normal progress or development o f the disaster m anagement system. He also 
mentioned that the NGOs can better play under supervision o f Armed Forces than civil 
administration.
NGOs Performance: A3 mentioned that the performance o f the NGOs is
appreciable but still it’s not magnificent compare to government ministries.
Development of ICS in Bangladesh: A3 particularly mentioned that location o f
Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and delegation o f Authority in ICS are the major exist 
conflict. He gave opinioned that the overall manager o f EOC must be a technical expertise 
rather to be a bureaucratic.
Case Study-4
Interviewers Name: A4.
Profile: A4, he was a professor o f Department o f Geology in Dhaka University. He
has working experience in UNDP also. He is one o f the national expertises on earthquake in 
our country. At present he is working as an urban risk reduction specialist in Comprehensive 
Disaster M anagement Programme (CDMP).
Interview date and time: 20 December 10, 1400-1530 hrs 
Duration: 1 hrs 30 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Government Representative: A4 specifically gave his opinion that military or
Armed Forces should not work under the Government representative during emergency 
response. And the overall control over the situation should be manned by a well experienced 
and a person with technical knowledge on that. During emergency response the command 
and control become a common issue which creates conflict and sometime ambiguity. He 
mentioned that the command and control o f the Armed Forces and civil administration 
should be balanced and parallel so that it doesn’t create any ambiguity among the civil and 
military administration especially at district level.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): A4 said regarding CM R that the present CMR is 
healthy and comfortable in our country. He added more that the civil and military 
administration can work together basing on good faith and confidence. He also mentioned 
that still in our country we don’t have any define and well coordinated effort for the 
development o f the CMR. He said that for successful implementation o f ICS during 
emergency response we need a healthy comfortable relationship between Armed Forces and 
Civil Administration. He feels to incorporate distinct policy in this aspect.
Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s: A4
mentioned that the relation between civil administration and military is moderate and has got
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less influence by civil bureaucrats when the Armed Force is act as a leading agency. He 
mentioned that NGOs which are working in our country their role and activities couldn’t be 
flourished without the support from government ministries. Sometimes it has been found that 
NGOs are showing better performance than that o f government ministries at local level. But 
at the greater aspect still the government ministries are better than that o f NGOs.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. A4 mentioned that the 
incorporation o f NGO in ICS is a positive step towards a well disaster management plan. He 
also mentioned that in ICS the NGOs can better play under super vision o f Armed forces than 
the civil administration because o f the following reason:
• The command and control shape is well defined and structured than any other 
organization in Bangladesh
• The Armed Forces never compromises with any indiscipline act or with 
comfortable which is very important for the humanitarian activities.
• This organization has shown the utmost sincerity and dedication in past disaster 
scenario.
He mentioned that the integration o f NGOs in ISC will help the Armed Forces to get more 
information regarding locality. Also the technical knowledge and expertise from NGOs can 
provide necessary support for preparation o f evacuation, search and rescue planning. He 
mentioned that the integration NGOs will give a scope to NGOs for duel performances with 
other organization and contribute their effort towards humanitarian activities.
Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: A4 said that the general mass 
has got the highest confidence on Armed Forces. And Armed forces have more experience 
than government officials in case o f managing disaster. And the proper distribution o f relief 
materials in affected area in respect o f distance or difficulties made the Armed Forces closer 
to the general mass o f Bangladesh.
Political Interfere: A4 expressed his opinion that Armed Forces enjoyed less political 
interference than any other organization in Bangladesh. And thereby the Armed Forces can 
ensure their relief distribution plan in time.
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Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: A4 mentioned that depending on the 
high mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces, but they have lack o f technical knowledge and the local database which is 
very essential for caring out any assessment. And NGOs can play a better role in that aspect. 
He also mentioned that the Armed Forces have got the skill and ability for managing the 
disaster and they enjoyed more experience than any other government officials and 
organization.
Delegation of Authority: A4 mentioned that the Armed Forces have got the skill and 
ability for managing the disaster and they enjoyed more experience than any other 
government officials and organization. He also mentioned that in district level the Armed 
Forces Commander should work as an incident commander and not on behalf o f the Deputy 
Commissioner (DC) rather as independently. As an incident comm ander the Armed Forces 
commander should work parallel to DC and before taking any decision he should discuss 
with the DC and maintain a well coordination all the time. Regarding delegation o f authority 
he mentioned that the Armed Forces should carry out ICS training at unit commander 
(Lieutenant Colonel) level, so that they act as an incident comm ander at district level. The 
defense minister (Prime M inister) should delegate the command and control (C2) authority to 
Principal S taff Officer (PSO) o f  AFD who is a lieutenant General rank (equivalent to 
Secretary). The PSO, AFD should nominate the ICS trained officer at District level who will 
act as an Incident Commander (IC). And the nomination should be done before the disaster 
take place. The nomination should be done basing on the following criteria:
a) Training on ICS
b) Previous experience on Disaster management
Supervision of NGOs: He mentioned that the NGOs will be more comfortable under
supervision o f Armed forces instead o f the civil administration during emergency response. 
Because the Army has got more skill than the civil administration, they are cooperative and 
well disciplined force. The NGOs faced bureaucratic problem while dealing with the civil 
administration.
Development of ICS in Bangladesh: He mentioned that the ICS is mainly a
management system by which an incident can be covered in a well manner and it is a part o f
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the disaster management process. The ICS is very new in our country and still we couldn’t 
developed any define policy on ICS knowledge. In Bangladesh the government couldn’t 
clearly defined the command and control authority in ICS context. We still don’t have any 
establishment or facility for impart training or knowledge on ICS to concern persons.
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Case Study-5
Interviewers Name: A5.
Profile: A5 has got the long experience o f working with national and international
humanitarian organizations home in abroad. He worked under OXFAM in Vietnam for a long 
time and M yanmar after the cyclone NARGIS. A5 at present is working as a disaster 
response management specialist under Comprehensive Disaster M anagement Programme 
(CDMP) which is funded by UNDP and this programme is the part o f M inistry o f  Food and 
Disaster M anagement Ministry.
Interview date and time: 20 December 10, 1535-1700 hrs 
Duration: 1 hrs 25 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Government Representative: A5 strongly gave his opinion that the Armed forces
should remain under command and control o f Civil Administration. He particularly 
mentioned that in case o f Flood and Cyclone the Armed force should remain under command 
o f civil administration but in case o f only earthquake it should be the Armed force that should 
command and control the entire situation.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): A5 said the CMR in our country is partially well and 
it depends on the situation.
Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s: The 
relation between civil administration and military is moderate but it depends on personal 
basis also.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. In ICS the 
incorporation o f NGO has been mentioned. In Bangladesh the NGOs are playing an 
important role from the very beginning but there was no jo in t effort by NGOs, Armed Forces 
and Civil Administration so far. And he mentioned clearly by setting his personal working
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experience in various humanitarian organization that in Bangladesh the NGOs still couldn’t 
put better performances because o f absence o f combined approach. He also mentioned that 
the in emergency response phase the Armed Forces can better manage the logistical side 
where as the NGOs can provide better community service. The community based 
development activities or any operation or relief distribution the NGOs can provide better 
service to Armed Forces.
Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: A5 mentioned that the 
confidence o f  the local people may not be focused to Armed Forces all time. From his 
experience he mentioned that the confidence mainly depends on the situation and 
performances o f the organization.
Political Interfere: A5 mentioned that the Bangladesh present perspective its very natural 
to interference o f the political leader specially in relief distribution. The political leader has 
got more influence on civil administration but less on Armed Forces. In case o f NGOs it 
depends upon their size and shape basically on local NGOs the political interference is more 
and international NGOs is totally free from this kind o f activities.
Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: He mentioned that depending on the 
high mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces, but they have lack o f technical knowledge and the local database which is 
very essential for caring out any assessment. And NGOs can play a better role in that aspect. 
Other than the NGOs the integration local community can also play a better role to enhance 
the efficiency o f  the Armed Forces.
Supervision and Performance of NGOs: A5 mentioned that the NGOs will be more 
comfortable not the under supervision o f neither Armed forces nor Civil administration. It 
only depends on good manager. A well coordinated effort and positive approach can ensure 
the good performance o f the NGOs.
Development of ICS in Bangladesh: A5 mentioned that the m ajor obstacles to introduce 
the Incident Command System in Bangladesh are the absence o f legal framework to 
implement this system in our disaster management process. He also said that still we don’t
A 15
have any disaster management act by which the Government can implement the ICS in 
various agencies. He also mentioned that the Government o f Bangladesh (GOB) still couldn’t 
introduce any effective policy by which the community involvements can be insured in ICS 
system. He suggested that ICS can play a better role in case o f emergency response but the 
entire disaster m anagement can be well coordinated by incorporation o f Disaster 
M anagement Act and Disaster Management plan with the contingency plan o f  various 
organizations.
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Case Study-6
Interviewers Name: A6.
Profile: A6 is an officer from Bangladesh Navy. At present he is working under
Operation and Planning Directorate at Armed Forces Division. This directorate mainly 
working on disaster m anagement related activities with the cooperation o f DMB and CDMP.
Interview date and time: 12 November 10, 0900-1030 hrs 
Duration: 1 hrs 30 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Government Representative: A6 said that the Disaster M anagement process in
Bangladesh should remain under the supervision o f Civil Administration. The Armed Forces 
only can play a supportive role when they will be called under the act o f “In Aid o f Civil 
Power” . He mentioned that the dependency on Armed forces should be gradually decreased 
and at the same time the capacity and efficiency o f the Civil administration should be 
enhance for managing any kind o f Disaster. In disaster management entire process or the ICS 
the integration o f Civil administration should be incorporated in a such a way so that the 
efficiency o f  the Government and other related agencies can be gradually upgrade.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): A6 mentioned that the presence existing CMR is well 
balanced and it’s enough for managing any disaster in our country
Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s: The
relation between civil administration and military is healthy in our country. The less scope o f 
working with military made NGOs little bit difficult for developing relation with Armed 
Forces in our country.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. In ICS the 
incorporation o f  NGO has been mentioned but still they are not that much capable to handle 
any situation alone. Some NGOs has got professional expertise they can pour their technical 
knowledge to support the Armed Forces personal for preparing the plan o f rescue or 
evacuation.
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Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: Because o f well organized 
team effort and disciplined activities makes the Armed Forces closer to the people. The 
people have shown more confidence than any other organization to Armed Forces in the 
history o f  the disaster in our country.
Political Interfere: A6 mentioned that the Bangladesh present perspective it has been 
found that sometime the political leaders are trying to interfere specially in relief distribution. 
It happened in many o f cases when the relief distribution is done by the civil administration 
and less in case o f Armed Forces. In case o f NGOs it depends upon their size and shape and 
connectivity with powerful donor agencies. Even though the political leaders try to influence 
the local NGOs some time.
Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: A6 mentioned that depending on the 
high mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces, they may be take the leading role in any emergency response phase but it also 
may vary due the type o f the disaster and situation. The Armed Force in Bangladesh still 
enjoyed the privilege to prepare the evacuation, rescue and relief distribution plan. In 
maximum time the plans are prepared by the Armed Forces alone and it accepted by all 
relevant government officials.
Supervision of NGOs: He mentioned that the NGOs can work with comfortable
under supervision o f both Armed forces and civil administration during emergency response.
NGOs Performance: He mentioned that the NGOs still couldn’t show a better
performance the way it supposes to be. The NGOs never showed a better result comparing to 
Government agencies in Bangladesh
Development of ICS in Bangladesh: He mentioned that the ICS will play a pivot
role to develop the disaster management system in Bangladesh.
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Case Study-7
Interviewers Name: A7.
Profile: A7 , is now working as a Directorate General o f Disaster M anagement
Bureau. He is a well professional man in his service. In his career he served in various 
important government appointments. At present he is working as DG o f DMB for 
development o f the disaster management process in Bangladesh.
Interview date and time: 03 December 10, 1500-1630 hrs
Duration: 1 hrs 30 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Government Representative: A7 mentioned that at district level the Armed Forces
Commander or the Deputy Commissioner (DC) no one should enjoyed the entire command 
and control over the entire elements. To support his comments he raised his logic that the 
Armed Force comm ander didn’t know the entire area, the position and quantity o f 
governmental resources compared to DC. So it will be wiser if the DC take the charge o f 
coordination o f all the governmental ministries in his jurisdictional area. And in our country 
perspective the authority for command and control will create more ambiguity among the 
civil administration and Armed Forces; rather we can use the word o f coordination. All the 
efforts at district level should be manned by a coordinated way. He also mentioned that the 
DC should be act as a focal point at district level. The Armed forces comm ander can enjoy 
the command and control authority over his men and resources only and rest o f support they 
can achieved from DC. At district level the Armed Force Commander can act as a operational 
commander and DC can act as a coordinator for providing all available resources to Armed 
Force representative for performing his smooth operational activities in his district.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): He mentioned that the relation between Armed Forces 
and civil administration is healthy and comfortable and it proved during AYLA and SIDR 
disaster. In our country irrespective o f military dictatorship or intervene in politics by Armed 
Forces, the people have good faith and confidence on Armed Forces in case o f natural 
disaster.
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Relation between Civil Administration, Military Administration and NGO’s: A7
mentioned that in our country Armed Forces have got less scope to work with the NGOs 
thereby they couldn’t develop good relation with NGOs. On the other hand as a government 
official he found sometime it becomes quite difficult working with local NGOs. He reasoned 
out that the local NGOs don’t follow proper accountability and they are more curious to 
advertise their humanitarian activities for receiving more donations from foreign donors. But 
he said the NGOs especially BRAC, MUSLIMS AID, OXFAM and the other international 
NGOs they are well equipped and having good relation with government ministries. A7 also 
mentioned that integration o f NGOs are well explained in recent revised SOD 2010 before 
hand they have included in our disaster management plan but in reality it has been found they 
are not cooperating well sometime. When any responsibilities are given to them they are 
ignored if it is not tally with their own agenda or objectives.
Integration of NGOs in National Disaster Management Plan: The revised SOD 2010 
has introduced the Incident Command System in Bangladesh recently. In ICS the 
incorporation o f NGO has been mentioned. A7 mentioned that accountability and absence o f 
control indulged the NGOs with corruption. Other than some well managed international 
NGOs rests o f  them are fail to prove their efficiency. He suggested that those NGOs which 
are involve with the disaster management plan and its developm ent can be monitored by 
Disaster M anagement Bureau (DMB). And in case o f disaster these NGOs can be 
coordinated or monitored at district level by concern local DMB office and thereby the local 
NG O’s accountability can be insured. A7 mentioned in this aspect one director separately can 
be appointment in DMB for monitoring the activities o f the local NGOs over the country. At 
district level the Armed Forces Commander can take support from the local DMB office for 
coordinating the local NGOs for formulating a jo in t distribution o f relief material as well as 
other logistical item.
Confidence of General Mass during emergency response: A7 mentioned that the people 
o f our country have got the confidence more in Armed Forces than any other Government 
agencies or NGOs. Less scope o f corruption, accountability and less interference by the 
political leader made Armed forces more compatible to the people o f country.
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Political Interfere: A7 mentioned that the political leaders o f Bangladesh are used to 
interfere in relief distribution. The political leader has got more influence on civil 
administration but less on Armed Forces. And they also influence the relief activities o f 
NGOs.
Skill and Management ability of Armed Forces: He mentioned that depending on the 
high mobility, distinct chain o f command and accountability increases the performance o f the 
Armed Forces, but it is not only the Armed Forces, the local people contribution also enhance 
the management ability o f Armed Forces. Armed Forces have lack o f technical knowledge 
and the local database which can be manage well with the support from NGOs. A7 
mentioned that it will be a difficult part for Armed forces to prepare the rescue and 
evacuation plan without the support from technical expertise from Government ministries or 
NGOs.
Supervision of NGOs: He mentioned that the NGOs will be more manageable by
Civil administration that the Armed Forces. He mentioned that the civil administration can 
coordinate the NGOs activities in a better way at a district level.
NGOs Performance: He mentioned that other than the NGOs who all are having a
well accountability procedure and vast network they could play a significant role but in any 
case not better than that o f concern Government ministries. He also added that the rest o f the 
NGOs are not well equipped and they are not actually helping the poor people rather they are 
more interested about their advertisement for acquiring more donation.
Development of ICS in Bangladesh: He mentioned that the major obstacles to
introduce the Incident Command System in Bangladesh are the none-cooperative attitude, 
Ego problem and willingness.
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Case Study-8
Interviewers Name: A8.
Profile: A8 is a specialist on Disaster management and climate change. A8at present
he is working in a renowned UN organization in Bangladesh. He is a well experienced person 
in the field o f humanitarian operation.
Interview date and time: 05 December 10, 1600-1730 hrs 
Duration: 1 hrs 30 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Government Representative: A8 mentioned that at district level when the civil
administration is failed or unable to handle the disaster scenario they asked the support from 
Armed Forces. So it indicates or creates scope for the Armed Forces Com m ander for acting 
as an incident commander at district level but on the other hand the DC is the highest body 
from the Government sector as well as the chairman o f the District Disaster M anagement 
Committee. So to minimize this conflict or the confusion regarding command control 
authority the DC can delegate the authority to Armed Force Com m ander for the period o f 
emergency response phase or a limited period o f time.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): He mentioned that the relation between Armed Forces 
and civil administration is comfortable though there was number o f intervention from the 
military administration but in case o f disaster scenario still the CMR is excellent in our 
country.
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Case Study-9
Interviewers Name: A9.
Profile: A9 is a specialist on Poverty Environmental and Climate Mainstreaming. Dr
He is a well experienced person in the field o f humanitarian operation.
Interview date and time: 0 5 December 10, 1600-1730 hrs
Duration: 1 hrs 30 minutes.
Interview Analysis:
Government Representative: A9 mentioned that at district level the Armed Force
Commander should not take the charge o f Incident Commander rather it should be manned 
by Deputy Commissioner. He gave an example that in 2007 there was a landslide occurs at 
LEBU BAGHAN near Chittagong Cantonment the Army was rushed to the spot and took the 
control over the incident. And unofficially they started to act as a leading agency. But 
according to Disaster M anagement act the City Corporation should handle the scene. But 
they failed to ensure it as well as the Army also didn’t follow the process. So this is a clear 
violation o f normal rules which was imposed by the Government. He also mentioned that 
when the civil administration will completely failed to handle the scene and asked help from 
the Armed Forces then they can act as an Incident Com m ander on behalf o f the DC and for 
the prescribed time only.
Civil Military Relation (CMR): He mentioned that number o f intervention from 
military dictatorship in our country made the CMR somehow complicated and it can clearly 
understand when the question come who will take the control over the scene. He gave the 
same example o f the landslide at LEBUBAGHAN. When the Army took the control over the 
situation and later on when the City Corporation came to the scene but out o f fear they didn’t 
take the control over the scene from the Armed Forces Commander.
Capability of NGO in the context of ICS in Bangladesh: He mentioned that in
our country the N G O ’s are more ahead to embrace the system o f ICS in their organization 
and when the Government ministries and Armed Forces still d idn’t prepare any ICS structure 
for their organization. He gave the example o f BRAC which is an international NGO and 
they have already prepared the ICS structure for their own.
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